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Volume 5, No. 1

Fall, 1958

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THE MERRILL-PALMER SCHOOL • 71 East Ferry Avenue, Detroit 2, Michigan

THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF MODERN MAN

ERICH FROMM*

My topic is the moral responsibility, or the moral problem, of modern man. I would like to express one principle which I feel is necessary to avoid misunderstanding. The general intellectual climate today is one of relativism in ethics. The assumption is generally held that values have validity only because they are socially accepted within a certain culture. The norm of head hunters is good for head hunters and the norm of brotherly love is good for cultures which have accepted this norm. The general assumption among most social scientists is that values and norms do not have general, objective, universal validity. It would sound, talking about the moral problem of modern man, as if I shared this principle. I do not and I want to emphasize it. On the contrary, I am convinced that there are certain basic norms and values for life recognized thousands of years ago by all great spiritual leaders of the human race with an agreement which is quite remarkable, although they had no contact with each other. These values are valid for all men and they are rooted in the very nature of man, in the very condition of his existence. This of course assumes the position that there is such a thing as man, not only physiologically or anatomically as we are all convinced, but also mentally and psychologically: that we can speak of a nature of man, of an essence of man, as an entity which is definable and ascertainable. This is another assumption which, I am afraid, is not shared by most contemporary social scientists.

I have not time in this lecture to go into the problem of what concept I have as I speak about the nature of man. I wish, however, to make a few observations about it to not just present to you words which without an example do not have much meaning.

Man is a freak in nature. He is the only animal aware of himself. He is the only living thing which is within nature and at the same time transcends nature. Man has awareness of himself, of his past and of his future. Man has not lived through his instincts as the animal lives through his instincts. He is uprooted from nature

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This address was given by Dr. Fromm in the Horace H. Rackham Educational Memorial Building Auditorium, under the sponsorship of The Merrill-Palmer School, January 22, 1958.

to a large extent and man, from the moment he is born, has to answer a question which life poses to him. What to do with life? Where to go? What meaning to give it? In fact, as far as I can see, there is one question and there are only a few answers. These answers have been repeated at various times in human history, at various places, sometimes conceptualized in one form, sometimes in another, and only a few answers appear again and again. The history of religion, the history of philosophy, is in fact the history of the system, you might say, of these few possible answers. But we all have to give an answer and what life we lead depends on the answer we give.

Perhaps I could give a single example of what I have in mind. Man has to be related to his fellow man and to nature. Man absolutely unrelated is insane. This, in fact, is one definition of insanity, the absolutely unrelated person. One can be related in several ways. One can be related by submitting one's self to others, by having power over others, by what one might call a marketing orientation toward others, a constant exchange like one exchanges commodities on the market. And, one can be related by love. The only satisfactory way, considering the nature of man, is to be related by love because love is the only form of relatedness which at the same time is relatedness and preserves the integrity and reality of the people involved in love. You may "love" in submission or by having power but you and the person over whom you have power or under whose power you are both lose their integrity, both lose an essential human quality, that of their independence. In love, relatedness and integrity are both preserved.

All this is said by way of introducing my topic, to avoid certain misunderstandings which could arise from the formulation. To put it from another angle, the moral problem for man is always the same. There is no moral problem for one country, then for another, or for one age then for another. But the particular circumstances under which people live differ and therefore different aspects of the same moral problem appear and need to be emphasized.

Most people, at least in our day and age and probably this has been so in history, make one mistake. They make the same mistake which the French made in the last war when they were fighting it with the tactics and strategy of the first world war, namely, to look back at the moral problems of the past generation or the past century, to look back at the vices or sins of the past; then, to state joyfully that we have overcome them; and then, to think we have overcome most of our own moral problems because we have overcome problems which existed in the past. Very often, however, we have instead problems which are just as severe, only different from those of the past. A few examples should make more concrete what I have just been saying.

NINETEENTH CENTURY MORAL PROBLEMS

Let me talk about the moral problems as they existed in the 19th century, allowing that what I am saying is not said about every person living 100 years ago but is meant to refer to a somewhat more general picture of character, of what one might call the social character of people living at the time. What were the vices of the 19th century? First of all *authoritarianism*, a demand for blind obedience. Children, women, workers, all were supposed to obey the authorities blindly with no reflections, no questions asked, and disobedience in itself was sinful.

A second vice was *exploitation*, crude exploitation. It is amazing to us today how gentlemen or ladies, with good consciences and very decent, could be engaged in slave traffic—well, that is not 19th century anymore but a little earlier—but how people could ruthlessly exploit negroes in the Congo was no better than slave traffic, or how they could ruthlessly exploit children in factories. That was a vice and moral problem of the 19th century which we have almost forgotten, and when we remember it we are somewhat surprised.

The third vice of the 19th century was *inequality*, of the sexes and of the races. There was conviction that such inequality was well founded, was the word of God, and there was complete indifference to the obvious contradictions between God's word and such inequality between human beings.

The fourth vice, if you please, was *stinginess* and *hoarding*; economize, the great virtue of the middle class of the 19th century; you become rich if you hoard, if you economize, if you save, if you don't spend; then a great virtue, today not a virtue at all.

And eventually what you might call an *egocentric individualism* of the 19th century. Perhaps I could give an example from Freud's work. Freud writes about the phrase norm, love thy neighbor as thyself, and he says, "what nonsense. How can I love my neighbor? He doesn't deserve it. I haven't so much love to spare. I have to love my family. This is just nonsense." Well, Freud expressed very courageously something I am afraid many people felt at the time without saying it so clearly. That was 19th century individualism and egocentricity. My home is my castle, I am I, and stranger beware. Perhaps there were more vices. I don't mean to be exhaustive in this. Now let us look at what has become of 19th century vices.

AUTHORITY TODAY

Today we do not have authority in the sense of 19th century authority. It has almost completely disappeared from the United States and from some other parts of the world. If anyone is afraid, it is rather the parents of the children than the children of the parents for a very simple reason. Today the general assumption is that the newest

is the best; the children always are newer and know more of the newer things more than do the parents. So, the parents have to learn from them.

Speaking of the problem of authority today as a moral problem I hope you don't mind if I go into some more general theoretical explanation about the concept of authority. It is very useful to differentiate between rational and irrational authority. By *irrational authority* I mean authority exercised by fear and pressure on the basis of emotional submission. This is the authority of blind obedience, the authority you will find most clearly expressed in all totalitarian countries.

But there is another kind of authority, *rational authority*, by which I mean any authority which is based on competence and knowledge, which permits criticism, which by its very nature tends to diminish, but which is not based on the emotional factors of submission and masochism, but on the realistic recognition of the competence of the person for a certain job. If I am on a ship and there is an emergency and the captain gives orders, I shall not start a discussion with him. I will submit to these orders because I assume, and I have reasons to assume, that he is competent. If I choose a competent doctor then I acknowledge his rational authority because I am convinced of his competence and of the necessity of following his orders. This is an entirely different authority, dynamically speaking, from irrational authority which is based on different motives, has different functions and has different effects.

Another differentiation in authority is between overt authority and anonymous authority and I think this is an important distinction to keep in mind. It is *overt authority* if father says to Johnny, "Don't do that. If you do you know what happens." *Anonymous authority* is if mother says to Johnny, "I am sure you wouldn't like to do this." Johnny knows from the tone of her voice what she likes and what she doesn't like. He has experienced many times her reactions of sadness, depression, anxiety and God knows what, and knows that if he didn't do what she subtly suggests this would have worse effects for him than a good spanking. In the one instance authority is overt and explicit. In the other, it is anonymous, it is phrased in terms of tolerance and permissiveness, and yet anyone who understands the game knows what is expected. I would say overt authority is much to be preferred because the person—many people in the 19th century did this—can fight against it. He can develop his character in the fight. He can become a person himself in opposing overt authority. Anonymous authority is almost "unfightable," if I may put it that way. It is like being shot at from the ambush. You don't know who wants it. You don't know what the rules are. You sense it and yet there is nothing to get a hold on.

The difference between 19th and 20th century authority is that 19th century authority was overt authority and 20th century authority is anonymous authority. What is the anonymous authority? The market, general opinion, general consensus, what everybody else does, not to be different from anybody else, to avoid being caught alone three yards away from the herd. So, everyone has illusions that he acts according to his free will but, in fact, we all know there is nothing about which man has as many illusions as about himself.

EXPLOITATION TODAY

We pride ourselves, and quite rightly so, that our attitude has changed drastically with regard to exploitation. It is quite obvious that within the great western democracies exploitation, in the sense in which it existed in the 19th century, has practically ceased, and not only within our own country and the western democracies, but also in terms of the colonial people who were objects of crude exploitation 100 years ago. This form of crude material exploitation of others, of making use of another human being to squeeze him out for our own advantage has, if not entirely disappeared, at any rate diminished to an extent that we can visualize it will have entirely disappeared within a few generations. But something else has happened. Today everybody exploits himself. Everybody makes use of himself for purposes outside of himself. There is one all powerful aim, *the production of things*, and not the aim to which we pay lip service, the full development of the personality, the full birth, the full unfolding of man.

In the process of being ultimately concerned with the production of things, of transforming means into ends, we transform ourselves into things. We make machines which act like men and we produce men who act more and more like machines. The danger of the 19th century might have been that we become slaves. The danger of the 20th century is that we may become robots or automatons. We save time indeed and when we have saved the time we are embarrassed because we do not know what to do with the saved time and at best we try to kill it. Imagine what would happen in these United States today if we had a three day work week. I am sure we would not have enough hospitals to take care of the mental breakdowns which would occur if people should be confronted with that much time and not know what to do with it. We worship things, the products of our hands, and bow down to them. In school or in Sunday school or in church we speak about idolatry and we think perhaps of Baal and other Canaanite idols, and we feel that being good Christians, Jews, or Mohammedans, or whatever, we have long since overcome idolatry. We have only changed the object. Our worship of things, our worship of the products of our hands, is exactly the same idolatry

about which the prophets talked and our gods, like the idols about which the prophets talk, have eyes and they cannot see and have hands and they cannot touch.

But man is not a thing, and if he transforms himself into a thing he becomes sick, whether he knows it or not. This sickness has been known actually much better to the French since the 18th century, and there are only French names for this sickness—ennui, malaisé, le maladie du siècle, the illness of the century—a phrase already coined in the 19th century. If we use English words instead of these French words it is boredom, the feeling of the meaninglessness of life, the feeling that here we live in the midst of plenty and have no joy, that life runs out of our hands like sand, that we don't know where we are going and that we are confused and puzzled. The French had a word for it and we really haven't; rather recently we have a word for it and we call it neurosis.

Few people come to the doctor saying, "Doctor, I feel my life is meaningless. I have a boredom which I cannot stand any longer." That is not quite the thing to say or the thing to think today. In fact, we should remember that every culture has its own ideology for sickness. Butler expressed it that beautifully in *Erehwon*. There, if you have a cold you have to say you are depressed. With us, if you are depressed, you have to say you have a cold. We are indoctrinated into what we are permitted to call sick, so most people do not say they suffer from boredom or meaninglessness, but they say they suffer from insomnia, from an inability to love wife or husband or children, from the need to drink, from lack of satisfaction in a job—any number of things which are permissible and patterned forms of sickness. And yet the insomnia, the drinking and the unhappiness are only various aspects of the malaisé, the illness of the century, namely of the meaninglessness of life which is a result of man's transforming himself into a thing.

INEQUALITY

Let me talk now about the third vice and its history. It is only a matter of generations until racial inequality will have been abolished in the United States. We have certainly abolished the inequality of the sexes, provided you don't assume that there may be a new inequality the other way around, but certainly no wife would take from her husband what a husband was accustomed to give 100 years ago. No foreman in a plant would dare to talk to his workers as he would have found very natural to talk to them 100 years ago. Inequality in that sense really has more or less been abolished, so we pride ourselves on having full equality.

But I am afraid we made a great mistake in our concept of equality. Equality meant—in the philosophy of the enlightenment, in

those centuries when equality surged up from an absolute state—that all men are equal in one respect, to use a Kantian formulation, that no man can be made the means to anybody's end; that each man is an end in himself and never a means, and therefore no man has right over other men which can make him means for his own purpose. That was equality in the philosophical and human sense of the enlightenment. What most people today, without quite being aware of it, understand by equality is *sameness*, being equal meaning being the same. You can even go a step further: to be equal you must be the same; if you are not the same you are not equal.

Indeed, we find today, I think Dr. Griswold said this some months ago, that people are much more *willing* to conform than they are *forced* to conform. Actually, it is one of the wonderful qualities of the United States that it has a great deal of space for non-conformists. Maybe not the top places are reserved for them in any field of endeavor, but nevertheless there is a good deal of space. They are neither in danger of being put in prison nor even of starving. The tendency to conform today is much greater than the social reality would explain. Man does not experience himself, his convictions, his feelings, as his and therefore the only sense of identity which he gets is to be like the rest. If he does not conform, he feels threatened by terrible loneliness, by being cast out from the group.

STINGINESS

Now let me speak about the fourth vice, stinginess. If the virtue of hoarding, of economizing, which was a great virtue of our grandparents, could be enforced today our economy would collapse. Of course, economizing to a certain extent is still all right provided you have gone on spending quite a bit, but it really is as expressed in a nice cartoon in *The New Yorker* some months ago. A man was looking at a new car with all the new trimmings and did not like it. His friend said: "Well, if you don't like it, that is all right. But, if all Americans wouldn't like it, what would become of our economy?" Actually, the person today is geared to *spend* and *consume*, spend and consume. Today consuming is a great virtue just like hoarding was a great virtue 100 years ago.

We are the eternal consumers. We consume cigarettes, drinks, lectures, books, movies, people. Even when we talk about the love a new needs from his parents, people speak about it as if it were a new formula which a child drinks. We are passive consumers, we live in the midst of tremendous wealth, and we are the eternal sucklings looking for the bottle, looking for the apple; consuming, expecting, and being always disappointed because we are not productive. We produce things but we are very unproductive in our relatedness to people—in our relatedness to things.

MY HOME IS MY CASTLE

Let me talk about the fifth vice, the "my home is my castle" attitude of the 19th century. A few years ago there was a report in *Fortune* magazine about a settlement near Chicago. One lady who lived in one of the new apartments said to the interviewer: "I am so happy that the walls are thin. When my husband is away, I never feel alone because I can hear what goes on in the other apartment." This is not "my home is my castle." Today actually courts an inability to be alone, inability for privacy, a necessity to be always together; that is called togetherness, teamwork. There are lots of words for an inability to be alone with one's self, an inability to tolerate privacy, one's own as well as one's neighbor's. Now that is exactly the reverse of the individualism and the egocentricity, you might say, which the 19th century middle and upper classes had.

What I have been saying, if I may sum up, is that the picture has changed; that practically all the vices of the 19th century have disappeared and have been replaced by vices of the 20th century. It is rather an unnecessary question to ask which is worse, because our problem is to recognize *our* moral problems rather than to rest on our laurels and to fight battles of the last war. If we look back upon the moral problems our fathers have solved and do not hurry to be concerned with the real problems we have today then we are in a very bad way. These problems with which we are coping are quite as serious as the problems people were meeting 100 years ago.

OUR TASK TODAY

I want to indicate certain aspects of our task, aspects which I have thought about but which can be touched upon only briefly.

An exceedingly important problem is to recognize and overcome an attitude which has developed more and more since the 17th century. That is the *split of man* between intellect and affect. Since Descartes it has been the majority opinion of modern rationalism that the affective side of man is by its very nature irrational, or non-rational, and that rational is only intellect and thought. Perhaps this idea has been expressed in the clearest and most drastic form by Freud for whom love was always irrational, whether it was brotherly love or erotic love. What is rational is intellect and reason and actually—and in contrast to many misunderstandings of Freud—the principle of the movement which he created in the world was to control, to dominate, affect by reason. This is the principle of enlightenment and puritanism and Freud belonged there and not to the famous decadent Viennese as is sometimes said.

Of course there were exceptions to this principle of the split. I have only to remind you of the famous saying by Pascal, "The heart

has its reason which reason does not know." That is to say, our affect can be just as rational, can be just as much in accordance with reason as our thoughts. Feeling has its own rationality, its own logic and, I would say from my own point of view, by being in accordance with the reality of human nature.

Spinoza was another great exception to this general split. Spinoza divided affect into two types, passive and active. Passive affects were what we might call today irrational affects like envy, hate, and strangely enough, for him compassion also was one irrational affect. His thesis was that with regard to these irrational affects we are slaves and not masters. In contrast to these passive affects, he spoke of active affects. He called them actions, although in an entirely different sense than the modern word action would imply. There were active affects, wherein we are the masters; affects which are in accordance with the model of human nature, which occur in the process of increasing our vitality, which go together with the experience of joy. He spoke of three such affects, similarly to what would be found in Buddhist thinking, fortitude and generosity, strength and courage, and brotherly love.

These were exceptional writers and there were others, especially among the romantics of the 19th century. You don't find overevaluation of intellect. On the contrary, they went to the opposite extreme and almost everything was good which was not intellectual. (In fact, I think this was one basic difference between Freud and Jung. Freud was essentially a rationalist and to him everything that is not intellectual was irrational. Jung was essentially a romantic and everything that is not intellectual was good, was wisdom and that has a great deal to do with his particular concept of the unconscious.)

Why we have developed in a top-heavy way is a very interesting question. Why, within three or four centuries, has all our emphasis shifted more and more to intellect and more and more away from rationality and intensity of affect? There is not time to discuss this, but it has a great deal to do with our mode of production, with our increasing emphasis on technique, with our necessity to develop intellect for purposes of science and science for the purposes of technique. We cannot quite separate the society, in which production becomes the paramount purpose, from human development in which intellect becomes the paramount value. But if we are to overcome our moral problem today, we must make a very serious effort to overcome the split between affect and intellect. We must restore the person to his totality or, as I would rather say, to his reality. I am not a mind and a body. I am I, and you are you, and my heart and my feelings can be just as rational as my thought, and my thought can be just as irrational as my heart. But, I cannot even speak of my heart and my thought because they are one, they are only two aspects

of the same phenomenon. There is one logic, one rationality and one irrationality which pervades them both. Whether we study psychosomatic illness or whether we study the phenomena of mass hysteria, it is all the same. Thought is made stupid by feeling and thought can be enlightened by feeling and vice versa. First, I think we must be aware of this problem because most of us are not. Most of us are somewhat embarrassed about having feelings at all.

Sometimes one can see in psychoanalysis that a person consciously, on the surface, thinks he is very happy. He loves his wife, he loves his children and he is very happy. If you dig a little deeper, this follows: He makes a good living, he is successful and is respected; therefore, he assumes that he has to feel happy. So his feeling happy is actually an assumption about feeling happy. Then you go a step deeper and you might say to this man: "Look here, I have watched your face now for several sessions and I think you look awfully sad and depressed. What are you sad about?" Then you might find that this person who has said that for 20 years he has never cried, suddenly remembers something from his childhood, something which was always alive in him, and cries uncontrollably. You find that to protect himself from sadness he had to protect himself from feeling, and over this protection from feeling he put an illusion of feeling, something which was nothing but a logical assumption.

Another aspect of what I consider to be our task I express in a word which I use for lack of a better one, namely to stop being consumers and receivers and become *creators*. What do I mean by creative? I do not mean to paint pictures, write poetry, or to produce music. I am speaking here about creativity or creativeness as an attitude, as a character trait if you please, as an attitude toward people and toward the world. For example, I can read a book and when I have read the book I have understood, let us assume, what the author says and that's all. I can talk about the book, if I wish to. That is when I read the book receptively, in the consumer fashion. Or, I can read a book, provided it is a good book, and in reading the book I do not only receive what the author has said but something in me becomes awakened; new ideas come up in me; I react to the book; and I am not the same person after having read the book. If I am the same person after reading, then, either the book was not any good or I am not any good. By not being any good I mean we are just the consumers.

Let me try to exemplify this a bit. I would define being creative very simply as an attitude of being aware and of responding. I fear many of you will think: "Well that is what we are all the time. We are aware and respond." I claim, however, that we are not aware and do not respond, or rather that we are aware but in a very peculiar and very restrictive sense. Let me give a few examples. I see a rose

and I say this is a rose. Actually, I see an object, I know that this object is to be classified as a rose; it is called a rose; it falls under this classification; and I say, I see a rose. But I think I do not see what Gertrude Stein meant when she said, "A rose is a rose is a rose." I do not really see the rose. I just say, "That is a rose" and in that way prove that I am able to talk, that I am able to recognize an object, and to classify it correctly by this word.

I see a mountain. What is the first question? What is the name of the mountain? Second question is, what is the altitude? And then I file it away. I know the name, I know the altitude and I file it away in spite of the fact that the name and the knowledge of the altitude have nothing to do whatsoever with my seeing the mountain. Maybe I take a picture of the mountain. I look in my camera, the camera looks at the mountain, I never see the mountain and then at home I show my children the picture. But if I say, "I have seen the mountain," I would be lying because I haven't seen it.

I see a person. I ask the person, who are you? And the person might say, "My name is so and so," as if that had anything to do with him. And, if I am not satisfied with this, he may say he is a doctor or whatever he is; he is married and has two kids. If I still say that I don't know who he is after this information, he thinks either I am a little bit strange or he himself feels somewhat embarrassed. Actually, that is the way we approach people, just as we approached the mountain. We classify them intellectually, we classify them abstractly, we don't really see them. Many of you have had the experience of seeing a person whom you know quite well—perhaps your husband or your wife, your child, or a friend—as if you saw this person for the first time, as if suddenly this person was more real for you than ever before, as if some veil had disappeared and you saw the person "really." In our relatedness to objects and nature, and to persons, we act primarily in an abstract, classifying, intellectual way, although we are under the illusion that we see or hear.

Let me give examples which show the opposite attitude. One I experienced in analyzing a woman who happened to be a painter. She came to me quite excitedly and said, "You know, I had a wonderful experience today. I was fixing peas in the kitchen and saw for the first time in my life that peas roll." Well we all know that peas roll like every round object on an inclined, relatively smooth surface, but we just don't *see* it. It is quite a different thing to *know* that peas roll and to *see* it; to find the confirmation for our knowledge, or to see it. On the other hand take a little boy who plays with a ball. He throws the ball, the ball rolls, and he can repeat it a hundred times because he really sees the ball rolling. He does not what most of us do. confirm his knowledge that the ball rolls. We are bored after the ball has rolled three times because we already know that the thing

rolls, and we do not see it rolling. The little boy sees and that is why he is never bored with it. Obviously, that is the experience of the creative artist. When the artist sees his tree, or his flower, or his scenery, or whatever it is, he is not concerned whether the tree is beautiful or not. He is not concerned by what kind of a tree it is, he is concerned with exhausting this tree in his own experience, the essence of this tree; that is to say, with seeing it. That is all.

The artist has a technical capacity of putting his vision of the tree on a canvas. Those of us who are not artists and lack that technical capacity have nevertheless the same capacity to see the tree as an artist sees it or as the little boy sees the rolling ball. To see a person—and I am here concerned more with human relations than with relations to nature—to see a person, to really see the person, to be able to say, "This is you," (that is all one really can say about another person, "This is you") meaning "I see you," means first of all that we give up the abstract intellectual classification. It means also that we give up the foolish idea that we know a person if we know his history. I ask in analysis working with a patient, "Well what comes to your mind about me?" And he says, "Well I don't know you." I say, "Well if after having seen me for 20 sessions you don't know me, you certainly won't know me better after 2 years, because all you can know about me is right here. You are afraid of knowing me." But then the patient will say like most people, "Well I don't know anything about your history," as if it mattered. If you really see a person, you know the person.

It takes some practice, it takes some sensitivity, it takes a good deal of objectivity not to project yourself, your likes and dislikes of the person, and it takes a good deal of concentration; but, with all our busyness in modern times to do every thing and many things, we are one of the most unconcentrated people who ever lived on this earth. We listen to the radio and read the newspaper, have a conversation with the wife, and a few other things, and actually we don't listen with concentration to anybody.

I could approach the topic from many other angles. I want to close by emphasizing one point. If we are to meet the particular moral problems of this age, we must make one decision; that is, to make means into means and ends into ends again, and not to confuse them. We must make a decision whether we are serious with our western religious and humanistic tradition that man is the end, or whether we are not serious. If we are not serious we better admit it. In the last century, Emerson once said, "Things are in the saddle." It is amazing that he could have said, "Things are in the saddle" so long ago, but today we really see them in the saddle. Our task is to put MAN back into the saddle.

SOCIAL WORK CASE RECORDING

HELEN SUMNER*

Case recording seems destined to appear and reappear as a trouble spot in social work. In part, this is due to social work's healthy practice of continuous self-examination and its eagerness to ferret out professional weaknesses. At the same time, it induces speculation on why the field generally deals competently with the abstract but less than adequately with the concrete. We speak authoritatively of psychodynamics but with little agreement and no assurance on the efficacy of our working tools. One explanation is that basic knowledge is collected and integrated for relative permanency, whereas the tools through which the knowledge is applied often become worn and outmoded, periodically necessitating either extensive repairs or wholesale replacement. We become more habituated to the accumulation of knowledge than we do to the use of the tools.

Perhaps it is at this juncture that the social worker balks at dealing with the concrete. He struggles against the loss or change of a familiar, previously dependable tool and discovers that changing a way of doing things is often psychologically no easier than changing a way of thinking. Usually, because he knows the change must come, he heeds the inevitable demands of reality and begins to participate in reshaping the old tool or designing a new one. But the process is labored, painful, and slow.

Social work has been through this experience time and again with respect to its case records. As the field grew, there was expansion of the need for expressing that growth through more appropriate working equipment. Today, questions threatening to topple traditional record structure are arising. Do we really need case records? Do they serve the function we say they do? Has the time come to discard them? Or, do we merely need to think of ways of altering them to increase their usefulness? What do they need by way of improvement? Actually, some of these questions were answered satisfactorily long ago, probably for all time. There is nothing that can appropriately be substituted for the case record, nor can it be abandoned altogether—it must remain if high standards of practice are to be maintained. Not to discard, then, but to alter, seems the order of the day. Surely, out of gains already established we have every reason to think that

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the more we experiment with the case record the finer tool it will become.

Early Concepts of Case Recording

A cursory examination of the historical development of recording will help to clarify the gains achieved thus far. Initial efforts at recording doubtless were based on the obvious desirability of keeping separate from all others those facts pertaining to a single family or individual. At the same time, a channel was needed through which a developing profession could express its accountability both to itself and to the public it serves. Early, it was agreed that professional obligation includes more than the enumeration and separation of factual data; it encompasses also the necessity for describing the uses to which the data are put and for reporting accurately those dynamics of interacting relationship which exist between client and caseworker.

Learning how to meet and implement these several responsibilities was not an easy task. Early practitioners believed that the surest way to maintain a high level of professional integrity was to include in the record every known detail and to record verbatim the interviews between worker and client. Margaret Bristol¹ helped to correct this impression nearly 20 years ago with her warning (here emphasized beyond her meaning) that *verbatim recording* is poor recording because it assumes an objectivity and a faultless recall not then or since demonstrated as possible in human relationships or in observations pertaining thereto.

Today's practitioners view humorously those early attempts to report the work accomplished indiscriminately and with no selectivity and are a little abashed at the pride manifested over the growth of an ever-increasing mass of information.

The second phase of development in recording fell in logical sequence. If *verbatim recording* was inefficacious because of too great length and insufficient objectivity, then something briefer and more clinically penetrating was indicated. Out of this thinking, *process recording* was developed. In this, the attempt was to learn how to make much finer discrimination between what had pertinence and what had not in a given interview and then to describe those pertinent aspects which clearly revealed the quantity and quality of interpersonal relationship existing between client and caseworker. *Process recording* simply meant an integrated description, unencumbered with trivia, of whatever problem-solving process was involved in the interview.

This newer method of recording provided many advantages over *verbatim recording*. It called for sharper thinking by the caseworker; it necessitated a much closer look at himself as an active and highly

participant partner in the whole problem-solving process; and, it demanded greater clarity in the expression of his thinking about the case. However, despite being more carefully focused and certainly more selective, *process recording* proved no panacea for the ills of case recording. It was better recording than verbatim, but it too was laborious, costly, and time consuming. Not wishing to give up its advantages and unsure of how to correct the disadvantages, practitioners clung to its use for what today seems an unexplainable length of time. (This is not to imply that the method has by any means become obsolete even now, but only to suggest that changes within the method were slow to come.) However, as a stage in social work development, there was some justification for this. Ruby Little² reminded that there was initially very little choice but to record in considerable detail. Social work was a new and young profession, "engaged in establishing both the nature of social problems confronting individuals and a method of help."

But professional youthfulness does not last forever. Social work today is demonstrating advancing maturity in its willingness to search for ways of condensing record content, rendering records more tractable (and, hopefully, less costly) and for putting them into sharper focus so they may be more significant, not only to the individual caseworker, but also to others having rightful access to them.

One method of recording which has been gaining in favor over the last decade is *summary recording*, in which the aim is to describe an event or series of events with both clarity and brevity. It can be employed to provide a regularly spaced, rather frequent summation of case movement, previously described at greater length in the record; it can serve as a thumbnail sketch of each client-worker interview (with dynamics well defined nevertheless); or, it can pull together observations and information accumulated over a period of time. Here again, although record length can often be significantly decreased, practitioners find that the method produces its own disadvantages for *summary recording* does not eliminate the need for describing process in the clinical sense of the term. Brief though it may be, it must still get at the essence of the problem and of the relationship between worker and client. It calls for capacity to condense *and*, at the same time, to communicate. However, *summary recording* has enough to recommend it to warrant its continued, and even increased, use. Certainly its lesser bulk makes clear its worth as an economic measure and since the excessive cost of recording has always been a major item in social agency budgets, any money-saving that accrues can be counted as gain. As skills for communicating (as well as for condensing) can be further refined, it may well replace all others as the most preferred tool.

Recording as Related to the Social Work Profession

Underlying the changes in recording methods has been the development of specialties within the field, and the professional schism which occurred with the emergence of the functional and diagnostic schools of thought. Case assessment and treatment goals in the various specialties came to be regarded as sufficiently different to warrant concomitant differences in case recording. While much could be said for this point of view, Bristol¹ maintained that this was not truly the case; her belief was that recording in each field was "basically the same" and that those variations which occurred were more or less superficial. She is not without support in this. Gordon Hamilton,³ from intensive case research and study, discovered no marked regional styles of recording. Still, there is evidence that specialties do hold a parochial view of the importance and rightness of their individual recording techniques, a condition which the majority of practitioners may later come to accept as justified and perhaps even desirable. To the writer's mind the matter of homogeneity, or the lack of it, is one of the lesser problems in case recording, providing the method is logically economical and does not endanger the quality of service given to clients.

Responsibility of Schools and Agencies

One of the major reasons for the persistence of recording problems lies in the too frequent failure of professional schools of social work and social agencies to see recording as a separate skill, and to take direct responsibility for teaching it. No fault can be found with teaching it as an integral part of the social work curriculum, but the assumption that a good understanding of casework theory automatically carries with it the skills necessary for good recording is without justification. It implies a false syllogism, for while only the skilled and experienced caseworker can produce a good casework record, not all good caseworkers have talent for good case recording. Learning to be more perceptive in client relationships, and to report succinctly the observations and activities of the interview situation can be developed through continuous practice and study on the part of the individual worker, but efforts in this direction will be more rewarding when schools and agencies have first provided a stable foundation upon which the worker can build his recording skills.

This does not mean that such instruction would result in perfection. The perfect record has not yet been designed; nor is it likely to be. Social work recognized long ago that agency function, worker differences and client needs vary too greatly to allow for any such aspiration; accordingly, it has never made any serious attempt either to

postulate the need for the consummate record or to construct one. Rather, the effort has been in the direction of modifying certain aspects of the traditional form of recording and of searching for ways to integrate newly discovered recording techniques.

Purposes of the Case Record

A pressing current concern is whether case records are fulfilling their avowed purposes, purposes well known to all practitioners and by some considered inviolate. It is enough to recall that social work uses the record primarily as a way of facilitating treatment, and that its main purposes have been identified as supplying needs in (1) practice, (2) administration, (3) teaching and (4) research. Basically there can be no quarrel with these purposes as satisfactory ends in themselves. But, the fact is that case records are not satisfactorily meeting them.

With respect to practice, the case record has been emphasized out of proportion to its intrinsic value, a condition undoubtedly surmised by many practitioners but seldom openly admitted. Among the negative results is the fact that many workers are prone to record with promotional opportunities rather than casework competency in mind.

Administratively, the record too often serves as little more than a means for quantitative measure of the intake, with other equally important statistics omitted.

In teaching, because a wide range of freedom of expression has been encouraged (and for numerous other reasons as well), records often reveal more about the worker than they do about the client.

In research, there is evidence that since data are not consistent in mode of presentation, research efforts based on them for the most part cannot be considered statistically reliable.

These discoveries are disconcerting because even though they may not apply to all case records it is unfortunate that they should apply at all.

Use of the Case Record

If the record is in any measure to fulfill the four major purposes for which it was designed, it must meet two important criteria: (1) it must be accurate, (2) it must be complete. If a record adequately meets these criteria, it should with little difficulty provide amply for use to:

1. Assist in analytic and systematic thinking
2. Provide for the orderly recording of all relevant material

3. Facilitate continuous upgrading in the quality of caseworker performance
4. Suggest ways of improving skills and techniques
5. Assist in determining efficacy of treatment
6. Inform supervisor as to kind and quality of service being given to client
7. Aid worker in evaluating own progress in adequately meeting needs of client
8. Provide a way for viewing one client as separate and different from any other client
9. Afford a quick glance at sequential development
10. Facilitate the total treatment program
11. Serve as a resource for summarized reports to other agencies
12. Avoid duplication of effort by serving as an immediate reference source where client, after termination, returns for further service
13. Insure minimum interruption in supervision and treatment program where case must be transferred from one worker to another
14. Help supervisor evaluate quality of worker performance in terms of capacity for professional function, ability to organize work, knowledge of casework as demonstrated in practice, and growth and progress on the job
15. Reduce through regular and up-to-date dictation the possibility of faulty recall and the resultant undesirable use of clichés, stock phrases, and vague non-specific material
16. Serve as a single repository for the permanent body of data collected on the client.

The 16 items must be applied cautiously. First, no matter how infinite its possibilities and how valuable its contributions, the case record must somehow be contained within the usual 8½ by 11 boundary lines. Moreover, many of the items will apply in some instances and not in others. The value of the listing is its use as a foundation upon which record content can be built.

Content in Case Records

Record content can be grossly defined as a body of material covering the factual, diagnostic and treatment aspects of a case. More explicit definition is easily acquired once there is agreement on how the record is to be used. In other words, record content is built around the purposes and uses for which records are kept and by which the amount and kind of content is determined. Following is an outline recommended as a pertinent guide for developing content:

1. Face sheet with name, age, sex, race, religion, address, family composition and other identifying data
2. Description of problem and comment on client's feelings about the problem
3. Social history-family background and family relationships
4. Causative factors related to problem
5. Diagnosis of problem and statement of treatment needs
6. Plan of treatment
7. Copies of medical, school, psychometric, psychiatric and employment records and any other similar data considered pertinent to client and his problem
8. Registration Bureau clearance slip
9. Progress reports (derived from treatment program)
 - a. Periodic evaluation of effectiveness of work plan
 - b. Description of interview content
 - c. Periodic account of response to treatment
 - d. Notation of changes and significant events in client's life
 - e. Account of client's attitude toward treatment process
 - f. Current status of case
 - g. Analysis of kind and quality of relationship between client and worker
 - h. Comment regarding movement or lack of it in case
10. Transfer summary (where pertinent)
11. Report of supervisory and other conferences wherein major treatment changes are recommended
12. Closing evaluation:
 - a. Identification of problem
 - b. Treatment used
 - c. Present status of case
 - d. Prognosis
 - e. Reason for closing case
13. All correspondence relating to case.

Obviously, the items are not listed in order of importance, partly because not all are pertinent to all cases but mainly because mentioning them at random highlights the need for flexibility in the way in which data are collected and reported. The material is about and for human beings and there is no known way of obtaining all case data in any one sequence. Necessarily, of course, certain steps must precede others. The social history and diagnostic statement which help the caseworker determine his course of action obviously come ahead of the actual treatment plan, both in the worker's thinking and in his record. It is also true that certain kinds of data and material must be entered in proper chronological sequence. But in general,

the location of content in the record is not as important as putting related material together *and labeling it with a topical heading.*

Content as Related to Treatment

Immediately after a client has been accepted for service the case-worker must begin the arduous task of problem-solving. He starts with the knowledge that the client's behavior is symptomatic and therefore he must refrain from being judgmental. Whether he exercises responsibility for establishing early behavior controls for the client (as would be necessary, for example, in a court probation setting) he will be guided chiefly by the type of setting in which he works but will in all cases take responsibility for building with the client a relationship through which the client's problems stand a good chance of resolution. To keep track of his several responsibilities and of progress in the case the worker must use the case record.

As indicated earlier, much of the interest manifested in case recording has centered on the problem of how to reduce record length. There is a corollary: the too brief record can be impotent and useless. Terse record entries do little to facilitate treatment. The worker who records in this way has either little interest in or knowledge of his client, or he has forgotten the prime requisite that the client shall be released from casework treatment just as soon as there is evidence that he has achieved maximum benefit from the treatment program.

On the other hand, many records are extravagantly long, not because they are overly rich in content but because they contain unnecessary duplications and repetitions of material or innumerable factual data of little pertinence to the case. Here, the question is whether the worker has not devoted much more time to paper work than to the client. In any event, it is certain that the treatment program will have suffered.

The answer to what is good recording lies in the thinking of those practitioners who are sensitive to the requirements of purposeful recording. Good recording tells a clear and complete story. It need not be lengthy, but it must be there!

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HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN TERMS OF "MORALITY" AND "PIETY"

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper defines the concepts "morality" and "piety" and presents the preliminary results of a study of behavior in terms of these concepts. Part II is concerned with definition, characterization, and examples of pious and moral behavior. Part III outlines a preliminary theory of piety and morality as they are learned in relation to cultural—particularly institutional—and psychodynamic factors. In IV we touch briefly on some evaluative aspects of the morality-piety distinction. In V we advance some hypotheses concerning individuals in our own society and in VI we outline the methods used in testing some of these hypotheses. Part VII summarizes the first results of these tests.

II. MORALITY AND PIETY

There is, in every society, a necessity to inculcate into children the socially learned behavior patterns of the culture. In some of these culture patterns the chief concern is relations with other individuals in the society; other patterns of behavior are more concerned with society as a whole, or, more specifically, the institutions that make up the society, and the individuals or symbols that officially represent them.

Learned reactions to situations where a choice is possible may be classified in terms of two extremes: (1) piety; relatively stereotyped, ritualistic behavior, rather rigidly performed in a way specified by the culture as appropriate to the situation; and (2) morality; relatively less stereotyped behavior deduced by the performer himself from some general principle approved by at least some members of his subcultural group. Similar dichotomies have been advanced as descriptive of these two extremes of behavior (i.e. magic vs. science, ritual vs. reason).

Responses of piety are characteristic of man's relationship to the institutions of which he is a member but all men do not react piously in all cases. For example, some refuse to salute the flag or go to

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church, and many go through the motions of pious behavior with no feeling, or even actual contempt for the pious act. One can also be pious in one institution and not in another; some reject religious piety but are strong supporters of political piety. It is also true that a person may honor his own piety and make it sacred while profaning the piety of another, as may be the case of a Protestant saying a "Hail Mary."

"Piety," as defined by this paper is an individual's learned response to a given situation having little "rationale." Examples of piety are: repeating ritualistic phrases in an unknown language, attending church on Sunday, rising when "The Star Spangled Banner" is played, facing toward Mecca when praying, and refusing to eat food upon which the shadow of an "untouchable" has fallen. Pious behavior is of course most obvious in religious institutions of a culture, but it is also much in evidence in political institutions, the family, and fraternal orders.

As has been indicated, one can be pious in a religious sense and non-pious in a political sense, or the reverse. We hypothesize that such individuals would be similar to each other in many facets of their personalities, although the one might often be in conflict with the other. In terms of theory it is important to recognize, as Rokeach¹⁸ has so well pointed out, the difference between *structure* and *content*. It is the structure of piety that we are most concerned with rather than the particular form the piety happens to take.

Some aspects of moral behavior would seem to correlate with piety. For example, when the moral principle is "my country right or wrong," politically pious behavior can be expected. A similar principle holds true in a fraternal order whose members blackball an applicant on the basis that he will not be an asset to the organization. Little consideration may be given to the fact that the organization might help the personality development of the *individual*. If one of the members takes this more "humanitarian" position, he may gain little support, since those who oppose the prospective member can point out that the foremost consideration must be the best interests of the fraternity. Such a position is strongly supported by the pious rituals of the order. The fact that each member reaffirms his loyalty to the order in a solemn ceremony which opens each meeting gives reassurance that one is acting righteously in placing the blackball in the ballot box.

Morality, by our terms, comprises behaviors that are not necessarily good in and of themselves, but, in contrast, the behaviors are individually chosen in terms of some principle that makes them appropriate. Morality is not specific to any situation, for the principles from which the behavior is deduced as proper are general and not limited to any situation. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto

you," for example, is a moral principle that covers almost every conceivable opportunity for behavior involving more than one person.

Where piety requires only practice, morality involves at least surface reasoning whereby a situation is assessed, a principle selected, and behavior supposedly proper to the circumstances deduced from the principle. It is recognized that an overt act, either moral or pious, is in large part determined by habit patterns developed in accordance with the concepts of learning theory and dynamic psychology. We contend, however, that moral acts, in general, involve a greater degree of rationalism than do pious acts. Compulsive "morality," where the individual is driven to go out of his way to do "good deeds" is actually pious behavior.

It should be noted that morality in our sense only partially overlaps the conventional meaning of morality. Conventional "morality" is indeed behavior deduced from principle, but also carries with it the value judgment of the society that some principles are better than others. Since we conceive of morality as behavior deduced from any principle, the criminal who refuses to "squeal" on his companions is behaving in as moral a fashion as the policeman who apprehends him because "criminals must be punished."

This concept of morality makes it unnecessary to deal with the ethics of what is "right" or "wrong" in a particular situation and allows one to concentrate on the problem of individual autonomy. This investigation is not concerned with whether behavior is "good" or "bad" but with individual tendencies to behave in ways that are motivated by adherence to general principles.

Just as religious piety sometimes conflicts with political piety, it is also obvious from the above that one concept of morality can conflict with another concept of morality. One of the basic conflicts of our time, for example, centers on the principles of the Judeo-Christian ethic as they differ from the principles of the Protestant-Capitalist ethic.

III. THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS

This study will eventually concern three closely related aspects of piety and morality: First, how do piety and morality develop in basic institutions such as religion, the political organization, and the family? Second, what differences are found between cultures or sub-cultures in terms of the roles played by morality and piety? Third, what are the factors in the development of morality and piety from a psychodynamic standpoint and what are the personality correlates of various degrees of morality and piety?

In every society man has created institutions (including economic, political, religious and kinship) within which the members are ex-

pected to function. These institutions and their interrelationships constitute the social organization of the group. Each institution develops its own "cultural content"—the expected behavior of those associated with it. As an institution develops and grows, this "cultural content" becomes more and more complex with a highly developed hierarchy of prescribed behavior. There is a tendency for the values, beliefs and sentiments to become sacred and for much of the content to become codified law. The development of a code is a continuous process, each new addition having a function at the time of enactment. The purpose of these codes is to control the behavior of those operating within the framework of the institution. Although new prescribed behavior patterns are added, the old ones tend to be retained after they are no longer functional. These "ways of doing things" are handed down from generation to generation, becoming so closely associated with the institution that questioning them is an attack on the institution itself. The individual is given these rules, as Piaget¹⁶ has pointed out, "after they have been fully elaborated, and often elaborated not in relation to him and as they are needed, but once and for all and through an uninterrupted succession of earlier adult generations." (pp. 2-3) Originally, the rule probably had an obvious function in the control of behavior, thus having meaning for the group. But when rules are not fully elaborated for the individual they have meaning only with respect to what the giver or higher authority considers to be the "principle" involved, the individual therefore tends to regard them only as pious prescriptions of behavior. As a result he goes through his pious ritual with no knowledge or understanding of why he does it. He does it because he has been trained to do it. Not to do it would bring feelings of guilt and loss of love—but in some cases, to continue to perform in ways that intellectually do not make sense may also create conflict.

Each institution, like each society, can be said to have what Linton¹¹ calls the "culture construct pattern" or the mode of expected behavior. Of course, the actual behavior of any one individual in a particular situation will not necessarily conform to the mode. As Linton¹¹ pointed out, "The real pattern of behavior is, in every case, not a single point; it is a range within which observed behavior falls." (p. 6) While this range is finite, nonetheless there can be considerable socially acceptable variation in behavior in a particular situation. As a result we would expect a range of moral and pious behavior on the part of individuals, with the majority clustered about a modal point.

Both moral and ritual prescriptions have no doubt played a functional role in societies where the utility of either was not particularly obvious. Moral prescriptions added order and predictability to the behavior of one's fellows, and thus reduce the amount of new learning

required in unprecedented situations. The result was a lessening of social dislocation and a great increase in societal efficiency. As a result the society could turn its energies to practical measures designed to control, or partially control, forces previously uncontrollable.

For example, the members of the society could be organized to construct public works to limit the damage of floods, and perhaps even to turn them to advantage. The probable result was reinforcement (in the learning theory sense) for such behavior of the members of the society, or at any rate of the religious hierarchy, since, in the long run, there was a lessening of catastrophe.

Similarly, ritual behavior could sometimes result in analogous reinforcement of behavior of members of a society. Moore¹³ (pp. 69-74) has shown that scapulimancy can be regarded as functional in the sense that it provided non-literate societies with a randomizing device advantageous to certain kinds of strategic enterprises, such as hunting. Otherwise, stereotyped behavior (as to direction of movement, etc.) by the hunters could become somewhat predictable to the game, and thus non-functional; scapulimancy, by suggesting new directions essentially at random, could be a functional adjunct to hunting behavior. After some reinforcement of such behavior, there is the added advantage that the hunters would proceed in greater confidence, and hence perhaps in greater efficiency, thus leading to a further increase in the functional status of this kind of behavior. Pious behavior, once established, of course, receives its greatest reinforcement in the approval of other members of the society, who reward the individual for the proper playing of his role, without regard to whether the behavior is "successful" in any given case.

The frequency of pious behavior probably varies fairly directly with the size of a society and of the institution that rewards pious behavior. We assume this because the teaching and rewarding of morality (deduction of proper behavior from principle) involves rather close personal supervision, and the necessary ratio of hierarchy members to ordinary participants (generals to privates, priests to parishioners) is much higher for inculcating morality than is necessary to supervise and reward piety. Piety may be stereotyped as to time and place so that a single authority-figure can teach, supervise, and reward large groups, whereas the inculcation of morality requires fairly close association with the individual for many of his waking hours throughout an extended period for moral behavior to be suggested and rewarded whenever the occasion demands. Hence the traditional popularity of the Sunday School and its equivalents, where piety may be taught and supervised, and morality inculcated in terms of hypothetical situations: What would Jesus do? That such institutions teach piety more efficiently than morality is due to the fact

that the Sunday School can actually instigate pious acts and reward them on the spot, whereas real opportunities for applying morality occur in Sunday School but seldom. After a review of studies in the area, Thorpe⁵ concludes that, "It is doubtful whether religious teachings *per se*, if relatively devoid of reinforcing effects of parental example and acceptance, can bring about desirable personal and social adjustment." Thus we hypothesize that strongly moral individuals will almost always be strongly family-influenced, rather than obtaining their most important influences from the religious institution. The family is the only group of individuals with sufficiently continuous access to the growing child to successfully inculcate morality for meeting the problems of everyday life.

As an institution grows in size, problems of internal control are magnified. Every religious institution of international scope has experienced to some extent the organizational difficulties best known from the experience of the medieval church as it grew from a persecuted minority to wealth and power. From close interpersonal interaction as the principal basis of moral teaching and reward, it burgeoned to a relatively rigid hierarchic organization, with vastly differing statuses, mechanisms of internal control of a relatively depersonalized nature, and great diversification of function (specialization in finance, agriculture, distilling, etc.). Despite the administrative skill of the medieval church, marvelous for its time, it was racked by charges of corruption and "immorality," the direct results of its inability to teach, supervise, and reward moral behavior. This inability stemmed from the social distance between authority and members of the church. The locally-centered sects that sprang up at the Reformation seemed, at first, to provide a solution. The only other remedy short of dissolution of the vast institution was to increase the emphasis on piety, as a series of behavior patterns that could be supervised and rewarded. Many other institutions of comparable size and complexity, non-religious as well as religious, have undergone similar transformations. It has even been suggested that an organization is in a state of decay when it has a new and large structure. It may be a case: the interpersonal relationships of cramped quarters stimulate meaningful moral behavior, whereas a large impersonal outfit bound by piety begins to lose its meaning and motives.

Boisen² explains the origin of new religious sects as the result of the loss of personal meaning as the old religion becomes increasingly institutionalized. The strength and fervor of new sects grows out of the fact that the members go to church, "not from a sense of duty, but because of an interest which makes each believer a zealous missionary, eager to share with others the blessing he has found." (p. 15)

In the small sect the members find the close face to face contact which brings about the internalization of the groups' attitudes and values. In such intimate groups the moral values conditioned in its members are likely to be meaningful and understood. In contrast, the attempt of the institutionalized church at conditioning through pious dictates, expiation and sanctions produces quite different results. Boisen² points out, "The person whose standards are determined by fear has not really accepted those standards. He is therefore not free. His conduct is controlled by something which is still external to himself, something which he resents." (p. 37)

Loomis and Beegle,¹² in discussing the difference between the effectiveness of the sect leader as compared with Catholic Priests in certain areas of Latin America report: "the Catholic priest comes infrequently, services may be held in Latin and not understood and the priest is not known personally. The sect leaders come in intimate contact with the people, develop effective relationships on a personal level, carry on services in the native tongue of people, and attempt to appeal to individual interests. They make every effort not to let general principles (i.e. emphasis on piety—TMP, DLO) stand in the way of helping the people." (p. 224)

Thus, in the sect, the leader gains his position and influence on the basis of his own personality and ability while the leaders of the established church gain their position on the basis of authority from an outside source. The sect, however, as it gains in strength and influence becomes institutionalized itself and so must increasingly depend on piety to control its members.

We are here concerned with the institutional status of morality and piety as we have defined them. We postulate that (1) morality and piety are employed in social control in differing proportions in various societies and institutions, (2) these proportions vary with the conditions of learning, and (3) the conditions of learning vary with the size and structure of the inculcating institution and also with the individual personalities of the persons who control reinforcement of the learner. We consider these points in greater detail below.

The institution, by definition, is concerned with the direction of behavior oriented toward some goal or goals. The instigation, supervision, and reward of pious acts provides the hierarchy of the institution with scale by which to judge whether discipline and direction are being maintained, at least superficially. Thus, the large-scale institution has a vested interest in piety on the part of all those associated with it, although, of course, at any given level, interpersonal interaction may be intense enough to foster morality.

The family, on the other hand, by its very nature tends toward the fostering of morality. As Murdock¹⁴ has pointed out, the nuclear

family is one of the rare true cultural universals. Since the nuclear family is a small-scale institution, whose members live in close association, proper conduct is essential for cooperation toward the goals of the group. Pious behavior largely leaves the problems of conduct still unsolved. Members must be trained to regulate their conduct in the daily round in accordance with principles agreed upon and transmitted by the elders. The opportunities for observation are many, the training period is long, and failure can result only from parental inattention to duty or from misapplication of rewards and punishments. Either of these causes may itself result from emotional maladjustment of one or both parents, but that is beside the point here. Ordinarily, the family inculcates moral behavior of some sort on some level. In what might be called a strongly religious society, church and family cooperate to inculcate both moral and pious behavior. The attention paid to the family by the Roman Catholic hierarchy is by no means misplaced, and the example of China, where morality and piety have traditionally been inculcated in the home, attests to the staying power of a cultural tradition founded on close cooperation between the family and the large-scale institution.

In most societies, however, the large-scale institution and the family do not cooperate in such ideal fashion. In complex societies where urbanization has been correlated with social differentiation, alternative institutions, including alternative religious institutions, make impossible a universal cooperation with the family in training procedures.

The family as an institution is today still linked to obligations of both a pious and moral nature. However, there has been a rapid change in emphasis in recent years. In the past when familism was more characteristic of the family, the structural imperatives of the institution were enforced within the family. In recent years with the atomization of the family there has been a loss of this function. Parsons and Bales¹⁵ (p. 16) have pointed out that the family has become almost completely functionless economically and politically. Also the pious teachings of the church, once strongly supported in the home, are now left more and more to the church only. Theoretically this should result in more moral and less pious individuals. The fact may be that many families today tend to produce individuals who are neither moral or pious or who profess to be both but have no strong leanings in one direction or the other.

Furthermore the individual's peer group is more likely to contain individuals of heterogeneous upbringing. Such models for learning, powerful reinforcing agents, may have notions of piety and morality which are at variance with those of the child's family and church. Thus, with increase in the size of the society and the complexity and

heterogeneity of its culture, the large-scale institution is forced more and more to concentrate its efforts on the inculcation of piety, leaving morality as a battleground to be contested between the family and the peer group.

In a society such as ours, the individual faces many life situations in which piety and morality are not incompatible, since situations in urban society are relatively compartmentalized in connection with their institutional settings. Thus we would expect that the degree of piety of an individual would not necessarily be correlated with his degree of morality. But crucial choice-situations for the individual could presumably arise when the peer group's demands (moral or pious) come into conflict with those of church (piety) or family (morality). Occasionally and sometimes dramatically, a choice situation arises in which morality and piety exert opposite pressures on the individual, as when the non-religious individual who does not believe in taking human life becomes a conscientious objector. It is significant that the political institution, true to its nature as a large-scale institution, insists on regarding as genuine conscientious objectors only those who can prove a conflict of piety against piety, namely, those who object to war on grounds of religious belief. It is much easier for a large-scale institution to rely on evidence of piety (membership in another large-scale institution) than to evaluate private morality so as to distinguish between a genuine non-religious moral objector and a true slacker.

We have discussed the role of the family in inculcating morality. The characteristics that enable it alone to do this with success (from society's conservative point of view) are: (1) intense and prolonged interaction, making possible (2) numerous opportunities for observation and reinforcement of moral behavior, and (3) reinforcing agents who have already internalized the values of the society. We have already pointed out that, for lack of the first two of these, the large-scale institution (such as church or public school) is in most cases unable to inculcate morality successfully. There is one other agency that may potentially instruct in morality: the peer group. Like the family, it is characterized by prolonged and intense interaction, and there is evidence that the motivation to learn (i.e., to conform) is very high in this case, at times higher than in the family. In addition, there are numerous opportunities to observe and reinforce.

What the peer group may lack is a leader who conforms to and teaches society's values. Therefore, the behavior inculcated may not be "morality" in the conventional sense, but it is no less moral in the sense used herein; the principles from which the peer group deduces its behavior are simply different from those approved by society. It is also beside the point that peer groups can teach a good deal of

pious behavior (much of it important as a badge of "belonging" to the group). Even large-scale institutions can teach piety. But morality is not taught by the repetition of principles: it results from repeated reinforcements of the actual behavior, often without much verbalization of principle. Thus the peer group is at once a source of social innovation and a threat to the continuation of part of the culture. In most societies, the values of the peer group keep changing in the direction of the dominant adult values, thus ensuring a relatively smooth transition from childhood mores to adult ones. Sometimes this is formalized by age-grading, *rites de passage*, etc. Difficulty arises only when peer groups develop subcultures so antithetical to that of adult society that the family has lost the battle for control of the moral progress of the child or youth. Boys will be boys, but if men persist in being boys or if boys perform adult crimes, a crisis occurs. Society usually reacts institutionally, e.g., with police, it being conceded that the family has lost the possibility of control. As in the case of conscientious objection to war, discussed earlier, only counter-piety (e.g., membership in an approved institution) suffices as a defense. It is a measure of societies' fear of the peer group that its counter-morality has no standing before the elders.

IV. EVALUATION OF MORALITY AND PIETY

A question that may be asked is, "Why piety?" Is not an autonomous individual normally of more value to his fellow man than one who behaves in stereotyped ways? The answer in part may be that man tends to ask for specification of behavior, just as the child feels insecure without some control from the parent. The fact is that the responsibilities of autonomy in choice situations are often more than most individuals wish to accept, or are able to, since it leaves the ego exposed and threatened. There is security in knowing what one is expected to do at a certain time and place, and this has the additional benefit of eliminating the need to think for oneself, which has been for most men the hardest of work. Fromm^{6, 7, 8} deals with these questions in *Escape from Freedom, Psychoanalysis and Religion* and *Man for Himself*.

Our exposition might be helped by a concrete example: the decision that young people make, of whether or not to have premarital sexual relations. The formal mores still forbid it, but these mores become so weak that about half of the young women in the country are estimated to have had coitus before marriage. Specialists in the field of marriage and the family have offered advice of one type or another to young people in conflict. Some have suggested that premarital coitus cannot be considered good or bad *per se*, but should be considered in terms of relationships: is it a constructive or destruc-

tive factor in the developing relationship of the couple? One young couple in discussing this suggestion wondered if a couple could really deal with the question in such terms; they asked if it is not too emotional a matter to be dealt with on a logical level.

It may be that, if a culture has developed the concept that an activity like premarital coitus, with its large element of basic drive, is not acceptable, then it cannot safely be left up to the individual members of the society to decide whether they will or will not indulge. If left to individuals, the decision in most cases would hardly be in doubt for long. It would seem that the issue must be made sacred and some pious prescription arbitrarily handed down, leaving no individual choice.

Thus the question of morality versus piety is not an easy one. An element of piety would seem necessary in the socialization of children, as it has seemed necessary in the political and religious institutions found in all cultures; however, the degree of emphasis on piety has varied from culture to culture, and from time to time within a given culture.

V. FOUR HYPOTHETICAL GROUPS

Because, in our own culture morality and piety each appears to have various components, we are dividing each for analysis. Piety will be considered in both a religious and political sense. The analysis of morality will deal with the concepts of both the Hebrew-Christian and Protestant-Capitalist ethics. Our first attempts to test for morality and piety however, will be concerned largely with Hebrew-Christian concepts.

We hypothesize, then, that morality (Hebrew-Christian) and piety each forms a continuum (Fig. 1) from lesser to greater intensity, with




Fig. 1

the two intersecting to form four quadrants. At the extremes there are four types: 1. high moral/low pious; 2. high moral/high pious; 3. low moral/high pious; 4. low moral/low pious.

The high moral low pious group. The HM/LP individual, often finds it difficult to live within the rules of the institutions in which he finds himself. One type of HM/LP may have such a strong feeling for his fellow men and their problems that he is willing to break rules in order to help them. The factors motivating such an individual can also be many and varied. Some HM/LP's are resentful of the system, for real or imagined injuries, but have sublimated their hostility into constructive channels. On the surface at least others seem to be basically stable individuals whose rational process has led them to the conclusion that, for the good of all men, a certain type of morality is the best course. Such individuals may believe the codified laws or mores are contrary to the general good. Historically speaking, such individuals have been the prime movers in revolutionary movements that have overthrown forms of government that have been largely pious in orientation. In this respect the HM/LP often find themselves in conflict with the LM/HP.

In regard to religion, the HM/LP would be similar to Yinger's²¹ secular moralist who takes the position that "... powerful and absolute religious sanctions can serve only to make rigid and nonrational what needs to be flexible and rational. Morality requires, in their view, continuous adaptation to a changing situation on the basis of constant study and knowledge of consequences. Their lament is not that concern over moral questions obscures the religious quest, but that a connection with religion obscures the moral quest." (p. 26)

The low moral high pious group. Individuals falling in the LM/HP quadrant can be expected to correlate highly with characteristics of the authoritarian personality as reworked by Rokeach.¹⁸ They are our heteronomous individuals who feel compelled to "follow the book," either to the right or the left. Such individuals deal with moral issues in terms of logic-tight compartments and some use religious sanctions to support their position. An out-group is inferior because "God meant it to be that way." The recent case of the member of the D.A.R. and the American-born boy of Mexican descent is a case in point. He could not carry the Flag in a 4th of July parade because he was not a "pure American." LM/HP individuals may be in positions of power in the culture since they often have the support of the institution behind them when they take their pious stand. From a political standpoint this is the case either in pre-war Germany, Soviet Russia or in the case of McCarthyism in the United States. They come into conflict and possibly lose their power only when enough of the mem-

bers of the culture are hurt to bring out the moral sentiments in the majority.

For this group as with the HM/LP, morality is not a part of religion but for a different reason. According to this position, the right belief and proper performance of ritual (from a structural rather than a content standpoint, i.e. religious or political) determine the quality of the individual rather than the moral values he holds regarding man's relationship with man. As pointed out in the case above some in this group use religious sanctions to back up their own moral view but others want religious issues of a moral nature kept out of daily affairs. As Yinger²¹ points out, "Many American clergyman who have become concerned over questions of race relations or industrial conflict or poverty have been told that they ought to 'mind their business,' which presumably does not include attention to such moral issues." (p. 26.)

The high moral high pious group. The HM/HP point of view is one taken from a philosophical standpoint by a large number of religions. It holds that morality is an inseparable part of religion, that a moral tenet such as the Golden Rule is part and parcel of it. Such individuals find no difficulty as long as morality and piety do not conflict, as is often the case. In other situations the conflict can be intense as when a religious or political official is required by law to impose a severe penalty on an individual for some minor offense or perhaps for an offense he is not sure the individual actually committed. Where the HM/LP would make every effort to consider the individual and where the LM/HP would take the position that the law must be upheld, the HM/HP would be in a state of conflict. As a result, the pure HM/HP might become an isolate from society. Many religious institutions have such groups in many types of monastic orders.

The low moral low pious group. The LM/LP, would contain individuals classed as deviants from society who seem subject to neither inner nor outer control. Such individuals flaunt the dictates of religious and political law and their own interests and desires take precedence over the feelings, desires and needs of others. In extreme cases, not self-imposed isolation as with the HM/HP, but society-imposed isolation is the end result.

Thus far we have discussed only the extremes in our quadrants. Any one individual can fall at a point in any quadrant, with the majority clustering near the point of intersection. These are perhaps Reisman's¹⁷ "other-directed" individuals. They are pious enough to abide by the mores and laws in general but are not so rigid that these cannot be broken when the stress becomes acute. In short they do not have strong feelings about anything and so are apt to be pulled in the

direction of whatever group tends to be in the stronger position at any particular time in the history of the culture.

There is increasing evidence²⁰ to support Riesman's position that the United States is in a transition stage from what he calls "inner-direction" to a stage of "other-direction." The inner-directed person would include both our moral and pious types where value patterns are inculcated at an early age giving definite direction to the individual in his adult life. Profound changes in the culture are bringing about a change in child rearing practices where parents are reluctant to make an issue of a value except that the child get along in whatever group he joins.

Crutchfield's⁴ "yield" group as compared with his "non-yielders" may also offer insight into possible characteristics of this group. His conforming group tended to be individuals who had little understanding of themselves, were defensive, had to put up a "good front," were rigid, moralistic, had great respect for authority, were somewhat anxious, guilty, suggestible, and were unable to tolerate ambiguity, lacked self-confidence, were vacillating and tended to be confused under stress.

VI. TEST CONSTRUCTION

To measure "morality" and "piety" (or the lack of it) in our society, we attempted to construct a scale that would give objective reference to the concepts involved. A series of forced-choice items, where the respondent is asked to choose between two foils, was constructed. The choice was between statements indicating alternative attitudes: (1) morality or piety, (2) morality or neither morality nor piety, (3) piety or neither piety nor morality.

The concept of construct validity as outlined by Cronbach and Meehl³ was used. The original items were created by the authors to differentiate between morality and piety as defined above. A group of judges were asked to pass on the items to determine their face validity. The remaining items were in a scale, administered to a sample, and two tests of internal consistency were made. The items in the final scale are presented in Table 1. The next phase of the study, now underway, will be to select the four groups by using the present scale, and by using a number of psychological tests and interviews, attempt to determine significant differences between them.

The following pages in this paper outline the procedure and summarize the data concerning the construction of the scale, with a preliminary analysis of the characteristics of the groups.

METHODOLOGY

We hope in the future to study the various aspects of morality

and piety in terms of motivating forces in human behavior and their relative meaning in various cultural and subcultural groups. Since it is impossible to approach the entire problem at one time, the methodology of the first phase only will be discussed here. We have selected our own society for the initial work and limited the values to be examined. As mentioned above, we will regard morality, not in the larger sense, but as those value concepts centering around the Judeo-Christian faith. Piety will be those sets of rituals that are, by and large, characteristic of the Christian faith. To study these concepts of morality and piety, it was necessary to construct a scale that would select the groups to be examined. Some of the items constructed were original with the authors while some were adapted from Allport, Vernon and Lindzey,¹ "Study of Values", Hathaway and McKinley,¹⁰ "Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory" and Gough,⁹ "The California Psychological Inventory."

Of the items, 64 were agreed upon as indicators of M (morality) P (piety), or both. These items were put into test form and submitted along with the authors' definitions of morality and piety, to eight judges acting independently: a Protestant minister, a Catholic priest, three psychologists with no religious affiliations, and three professors who represented Congregationalist, Unitarian, and Jewish religious attitudes. The two foils in each question were rated on the basis of, if selected by a respondent, indicating morality, piety or neither of these. Items were retained only when six or more of the eight judges agreed on the significance of both foils. Of the original 64 items, 44 were retained. Twenty of the items formed a P-M scale, where one foil indicated piety and the other morality. The remaining items were equally divided between an M scale and a P scale. Each of these contained 10 items. These two scales provided a tool for preliminary selection of the four groups as described above, since it was theoretically possible for an individual to fall at any point in the graph in Fig. 1.

The original form of 64 items was administered to a sample of 290 students on the Davis campus of the University of California. This form was scored on the basis of the 44 items approved by the judges, so that each individual was given an M score, a P score, and an MP score. These were treated as individual tests and were tested for internal reliability by using a short method for determining the Product-Moment coefficient of correlation.⁵ Two items on the M scale and two on the P scale were eliminated as not agreeing with the other items in determining M and P. The final M and P scale thus consisted of 8 items each.

These two scales were then used to select the four criterion groups referred to above.

Any respondent who scored in the center of either scale, i.e., a 4 or 5, was not selected. Thus, only a score of 1, 2, 3 or 6, 7, or 8 on both scales, placed him in one of the four quadrants (Fig. 1). Of the total sample of 290, 16 fell in the HM/LP group, 41 in the HM/HP group, 19 in the LM/HP group, and 29 in the LM/LP group. These four groups were used for two purposes: (1) further testing of the scale, and (2) an aid in developing hypotheses regarding the characteristics of the four groups.

FURTHER TESTING OF THE SCALE

The four criterion groups thus obtained were compared on 64 original items and the chi-square test of significance was used to determine those items which differentiated between the four groups. Since the M and P scale items were used to select the groups in the first place most were significant at the .01 level. However, four items, two on each scale were found to be not significant and were eliminated as not consistent with the others. Two items (6, and 9 in Table 1) in the original 64, that were discarded because of the judges' evaluation, were found to differentiate at the .01 level between the two HM groups and the two LM groups. These two items were therefore restored to the M scale. None of the other 20 items rejected by the judges was found to be significant.

With 1, 8, 13, 14, 18 and 20, one foil indicated piety and the other neither morality nor piety. As would be expected both the HM/HP and LM/HP were significantly different on each of these items from the LP groups. Items 2, 4, 11, 16 and 17, where one foil indicated M and the other neither M nor P, were used as items in determining morality. On all of these items, as well as items 6, and 9, the HM/HP group and the HM/LP group were significantly different from the two LM groups. Items 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15 and 19 were items where one foil indicated M and the other P. These items were not used in determining the four groups, so can be regarded as helpful in verifying the differences that might exist among them. The M foil in these items was selected a significantly greater number of times by the HM/LP group and LM/LP group than by the HM/HP and LM/HP groups. Conversely, the P foil was selected by a significantly greater number of the HP groups than by the other two.

VII. DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSES OF THE FOUR GROUPS

It is recognized that this analysis must be considered preliminary at least since eleven of the twenty items upon which it is based were used in creating the criterion groups. However, the results have indicated some possible errors in our original hypothesis regarding the groups and has suggested others.

TABLE 1

Items in the total scale found to be significant below the .05 level of significance by the chi-square test and percentage in the criterion groups selecting each foil. Items 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 16 and 17 represent a moral response or neither a moral nor pious response. Items 1, 8, 13, 14, 18 and 20 represent a pious response or neither a moral nor pious response. Items 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15 and 19 represent either a moral or pious response.

	HMLP N = 16	HMHP N = 41	LMHP N = 19	LMLP N = 29
	per cent			
1. Which is worse?				
a) a person who sins but repents in the bosom of the church.....	63	32	37	86
b) a person who does not sin but denies all religion	25	66	63	10
no response	12	2	0	4
2. Which of the following would you consider the more important function of education?				
a) its preparation for participation in community activities and aiding less fortunate persons.....	69	61	21	17
b) to train for an occupation.....	31	39	79	83
no response	0	0	0	0
3. The aim of the churches at the pres- ent time should be:				
a) to bring out altruistic and charita- ble tendencies	56	27	16	45
b) to encourage spiritual worship and a sense of communion with the highest	44	73	79	52
no response	0	0	0	0
4. I believe that when it comes to capital punishment:				
a) society can deal effectively with crime without resorting to it.....	62	51	16	7
b) in many cases it is the only re- course society has.....	38	49	84	93
no response	0	0	0	0
5. Which of these character traits do you consider the more desirable?				
a) reverence	13	49	37	7
b) unselfishness	87	51	63	93
no response	0	0	0	0

- | | | | | |
|---|----|----|----|----|
| 6. I believe that if I hit a dog on a lonely country road and was traveling at a rather fast rate of speed: | | | | |
| a) I am sure I would stop..... | 88 | 80 | 63 | 55 |
| b) I might not stop..... | 6 | 20 | 37 | 45 |
| no response | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 7. Would you consider it more important for your child to secure training in: | | | | |
| a) religion | 13 | 54 | 53 | 17 |
| b) human values | 87 | 46 | 47 | 83 |
| no response | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8. Which is worse? | | | | |
| a) playing hooky from school..... | 94 | 56 | 53 | 93 |
| b) playing hooky from Sunday school | 6 | 41 | 42 | 7 |
| no response | 0 | 3 | 5 | 0 |
| 9. I believe that if I were engaged in an industrial organization I would prefer to: | | | | |
| a) be in an administrative position.. | 44 | 37 | 58 | 79 |
| b) be a counselor for employees.... | 51 | 61 | 42 | 21 |
| no response | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 10. I believe that one should guide his conduct according to: | | | | |
| a) his religious faith..... | 44 | 68 | 89 | 48 |
| b) ideals of charity..... | 56 | 32 | 11 | 48 |
| no response | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 11. I believe that in general: | | | | |
| a) harsh imprisonment tends to only embitter a criminal | 56 | 61 | 11 | 17 |
| b) harsh imprisonment is the only way we can protect society from some criminals | 44 | 37 | 84 | 83 |
| no response | 0 | 2 | 5 | 0 |
| 12. I believe that I would prefer to marry a person who: | | | | |
| a) is fundamentally spiritual in attitudes toward life..... | 19 | 61 | 63 | 28 |
| b) likes to help people..... | 75 | 39 | 37 | 72 |
| no response | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

- | | | | | |
|--|----|----|----|----|
| 13. Which of the following men contributed more to the progress of mankind? | | | | |
| a) St. Paul | 38 | 66 | 69 | 41 |
| b) Abraham Lincoln | 62 | 29 | 26 | 52 |
| no response | 0 | 5 | 5 | 7 |
| 14. Suppose you were in a position to help raise standards of living or to mould public opinion regarding moral behavior. Would you prefer to influence? | | | | |
| a) standards of living | 62 | 17 | 16 | 59 |
| b) moral behavior | 38 | 83 | 84 | 41 |
| no response | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 15. I believe that man's first duty is to: | | | | |
| a) love God | 50 | 76 | 84 | 45 |
| b) do work which benefits others | 44 | 24 | 16 | 55 |
| no response | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 16. I believe that I would prefer to be a: | | | | |
| a) law enforcement officer | 19 | 20 | 74 | 83 |
| b) social welfare worker | 81 | 80 | 26 | 17 |
| no response | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 17. I believe that when I think of the Negro segregation problem, I would: | | | | |
| a) like to help in desegregation | 87 | 73 | 21 | 38 |
| b) rather stay out of it | 13 | 27 | 74 | 62 |
| no response | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| 18. When witnessing a gorgeous ecclesiastical ceremony, which impresses you most? | | | | |
| a) the effect of the ceremony on individuals | 81 | 15 | 16 | 59 |
| b) spiritual meaning of the occasion | 13 | 85 | 79 | 34 |
| no response | 6 | 0 | 5 | 7 |
| 19. Which is worse? | | | | |
| a) forgetting an appointment with a friend | 81 | 44 | 26 | 66 |
| b) failing to attend church | 13 | 56 | 69 | 31 |
| no response | 6 | 0 | 5 | 3 |
| 20. Which is worse? | | | | |
| a) blasphemy (taking God's name in vain) | 75 | 95 | 95 | 55 |
| b) obscenity (use of "Anglo-saxon four-letter words") | 25 | 5 | 0 | 41 |
| no response | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 |

A significantly greater number of LM/LP individuals, in reacting to the MP items, rejected the P foil. In looking at the response of this group to the M scale, however, it becomes evident that the selection of the moral item represented more of a rejection of anything religious than any strongly held moral values. Although, we might hypothesize that this group is not pious in a religious sense, it may not be said that they are not pious in a political or economic sense. A number of items that were not included in the final scale (because they did not differentiate between morality and religious piety) did differentiate between the LM/LP group and all the others. The following items are examples, each of which was significant at the .01 level.

I believe good government should aim at:

- a. more aid for the poor, sick, and old.
- b. the development of prestige and respect among nations.

The percent that selected foil (b) in each group was: HM/LP 31%, HM/HP 41%, LM/HP 53% and LM/LP 79%.

Those who hold national prestige above the welfare of people cannot be said to be moral in the Hebrew-Christian sense of the word. Certainly these same people can be religiously pious, and this is indicated by the response of our sample as well as by historical events. Again, an individual may not be pious in a religious sense but quite pious in a political sense which may be the case with many in this group. Another item that did not differentiate between the HM/LP, HM/HP and LM/HP groups but did for the LM/LP groups was:

I believe that it is more important for a father to be:

- a. kind
- b. successful in his occupation

The percentage that checked foil (b) in each group was: HM/LP 12%, HM/HP 0%, LM/HP 5% and LM/LP 34%. While the major share of each group picked foil (a), it may be noted that, since a significantly different percentage of the LM/LP group selected an item that is neither moral nor religiously pious, the value system for many of them must lie in another area. The selection of such an item over the alternative of parental kindness puts one in mind of Puritan piety, which in its later form in the American culture largely eliminated the religious element, leaving it only with its economic component.

A similar question also differentiated only between the LM/LP group and the other three:

I believe that one should guide his conduct according to:

- a. the views of his associates
- b. ideals of charity

The per cent that selected foil (a) in each group was: HM/LP 13%, HM/HP 5%, LM/HP 11% and LM/LP 31%. Again, a greater number in the last group are apparently guided neither by the moral nor pious dictates of the Judeo-Christian tradition but tend to be other-directed individuals, easily swayed by the opinions of others. Thus there is an indication that the LM/LP group is composed of some individuals whose values are those of the protestant-capitalistic ethic, and who may well be as inner-directed in nature as the moral or pious groups. There may be other LM/LP's who are more like the middle group who hold to some pious and some moral values but who feel strongly about neither. It is also not likely that these individuals will feel strongly about either political or economic values. Further study will investigate these points.

It is evident from an analysis of the items that the HM/LP group reject religious piety yet seem to have a high moral orientation. Most of the individuals in this group agreed that the aim of a church should be to bring out charitable tendencies in people (item 3), whereas the HM/HP and LM/LP groups agreed that encouraging spiritual worship was most important. The HM/LP group preferred unselfishness to reverence as a character trait (item 5) to a significantly greater degree than did the two HP groups. They felt that training in human values was more important than training in religion (item 7) and that playing hooky from school was worse than playing hooky from Sunday School (item 8). They believed to a greater degree than the pious groups that one should guide one's conduct according to ideals of charity rather than religious faith (item 10). That the Christian faith includes ideals of charity was evidently not considered by many in the group. They would prefer to marry a person who likes to help people than one who has a spiritual attitude toward life (item 12) and they believe that man's first duty is to do work that benefits others rather than to love God (item 15). There is of course a question regarding the degree to which some in this group select moral items as a result of rejection of institutionalized religion as was evidently the case with the LM/LP group.

The HP/HM group picked a moral item whenever it did not conflict with a pious one. As indicated above, where a conflict did exist, the value preference was in the direction of the religiously oriented foil. These seem to be people with religious training and background who have also held to the moral values of the Judeo-Christian faith. It is, however, significant that, when humanistic values conflict with piety, the latter tends to be picked. This group, for example, along with the HP/LM, believe that it is better to sin and repent in the church than not to sin but deny all religion (item 1).

The HP/LM group seems to be directed by piety alone with little

of the moral component of religion to go along with it. On questions where there was a choice between a moral response and a response neither moral nor pious, the second foil was picked by a larger percentage than either of the moral groups. HP/LM individuals feel that occupational training is a more important function of education than preparation for participation in community activities and aiding those who need help (item 2). They also believe that capital punishment is necessary (item 4) and that they would rather not help in fighting segregation (item 17). Along with the LM/LP groups, they believe that harsh imprisonment is the only way to handle some criminals (item 11) and they would rather be in an administrative position that might indicate power than work as a counselor for employees (item 9). A further indication of this value pattern is the preference for a position as a law enforcement officer rather than as a social worker (item 16). The religiously pious as well as the politically pious person is perhaps motivated by a need to keep others and himself in what he regards as the accepted pattern of behavior.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to outline in this paper a general concept of morality and piety as they relate to human behavior. Secondly, we have described the first phase of an effort to investigate one aspect of the concept by using empirical methods. This consisted of the construction of a scale to differentiate four differing value constructs in regard to morality-piety.

The scales at this point are not considered to be either valid or reliable. Further work is needed to determine their value as research instruments. However, they have proved useful in examining the theoretical constructs presented in the first part of the paper. In addition to further testing of the M and P scales, testing for piety in the economic and political areas will be attempted as well as intensive study of individuals who fall into the various groups.

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BASIC EDUCATION IN INDIA

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All education is a preparation for life. Nowhere is this saying more honored in the breach than in India. Nowhere is this more necessary than in the villages of rural India in which more than 75 percent of the population lives.

When the British first came to India, they found a system of "self-governing republics" consisting of the village Panchayats. Panch means five and the Panchayat was a council of five elders with both judicial and executive power. Its members were treated with the greatest respect and most work in a village was done cooperatively under the supervision of the Panchayat. Largely owing to this system of local self government Hindu culture and civilization have survived to this day.

These village communities developed not only public halls, temples, monasteries and hospitals but also schools of learning. One system of primary education was called the Madras system or, later, Bell system. It was a monitorial or pupil-teacher system. In village schools scattered over the countryside a rudimentary education was given to the children of the village. Seated under a tree or on the veranda of a house, the children learned to trace the letters of the alphabet in the sand with their fingers or recite spelling lessons or multiplication tables. This learning was not religious but secular education.

From earliest times the teacher held a definite place in the village economy. He was paid in kind, usually with rent-free land or by assignment of grain from the village harvest. Historians like Vakil and Ludlow, in the course of their research, discovered that the children of the Hindu villages were able to read and write and that the Brahmin, the priestly class, felt it their bounden duty to impart knowledge of all kinds to the people without expectation of payment.

There can be no doubt that when the British first started thinking in terms of education they thought in terms of higher education which never did filter down to the villages as they expected. Thus, elementary education was neglected, the rich few receiving all the education and preferments, while the many poor did not get even the mini-

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mum. In the system the British introduced, they ignored Indian culture. "Education is not merely imparting of knowledge, but is itself a culture which grows and flourishes in its own soil. It was a mistake to think that Indians could be educated by implanting a foreign system and destroying indigenous culture." (K. L. Srimali in "The Wardha Scheme.")

Human minds are not blank sheets of paper upon which any legend or faith can be written. Macaulay's pious hope to make a clean sweep of everything Indian and "to write on the clean slate of the Indian mind the word 'English'" was to be measured in the twentieth century. Education cannot come from above, it must come from within and below. This is as preposterous as building a twenty story building without first laying the foundations. Britain tried to transfer western civilization into the Indian mind without taking account of the thousands of years of traditions that had become the very life blood of India. Britain may not have tried deliberately to destroy Indian culture, but by making English the medium of instruction, she compelled the Indians to act in a way entirely foreign to their culture. The products of this system of education formed a community by themselves. They lived in India and yet lived outside. They could not associate with fellow countrymen except those who were like them; they could not sympathize with other Indians' aspirations and they did not feel at home in their motherland.

The system separated the child from his physical environment. His social surroundings meant nothing. The courses taught in school were entirely unrelated to Indian life. Even history was British history: Wordsworth and Shelley, Keats and Byron, were the neighbors and friends. Poems written by Sarojini Naidu and Rabindranath Tagore meant nothing to the child. The school became, instead of a complement to the home, an unreal dream of six hours a day during which "Jack and Jill went up the hill" was heard more often than the Panchatantra stories or the Hitopadesh. The crow and the Myna were not known to the Indian child but the robin and the lark sounded in his ear.

A press communique issued in Madras in 1937 stated the case clearly:

The scheme of studies for elementary school is not sufficiently related to the life and surroundings of both parents and pupils. This is particularly so in the rural elementary schools. If the village school is to be of real value to the village children and to the surrounding rural life generally, the teaching imparted in the school must be directly related to the realities of life in its environment. The stereotyped methods now generally employed by school masters, many of whom do not belong to rural areas, tend to make study in the school something foreign and extraneous, and therefore something difficult and un-

interesting to the majority of the pupils. The teaching of nature study for example, from a textbook without its being in any related to the actual life in and around the school is of no practical value. There is little or no power of observation, hardly any practical work and no interest in gardening. The teacher usually tends to divorce the pupil from village life and hereditary occupations rather than help to train better villagers . . . the main reason for the abnormal wastage in elementary schools lies in the schools themselves—inadequate, improperly equipped schools and above all, curricula and methods of teaching completely unrelated to the life and surroundings of both the parents and the pupils.

The British system with its emphasis on the English language split Indian society into classes which ultimately formed new "castes" in India to add to the innumerable ones already existing. British educators overlooked the great truth that a national literature can only co-exist with a national language, and that as long as knowledge is clothed in a foreign garb it can be the property of only a few who can command the leisure and opportunity and money for its attainment. "It was obvious that a language so difficult as English and so utterly discordant with every Indian dialect, could never become the universal medium of instruction, and even if it would be extensively studied which itself is highly improbable, it would constitute the literature of a class and never that of a whole nation." (Wilson's "History of British India," Vol. III.)

The system lacked the most characteristic spirit of former Indian education. Lord Ronaldshay, in his famous "The Heart of Aryavarta" (p. 13), said: "The high school and undergraduate courses are essentially western courses, unrelated to Indian life as it was lived before the advent of the British. They are rigidly mechanical and altogether lack that intimate relationship between teacher and taught which are an outstanding feature of the indigenous system."

The system laid almost exclusive emphasis upon a literary education because the primary aim was to prepare young men for government clerical jobs. Arthur Mayhew in "The Education of India" stated the aims of English education quite clearly: First, it was necessary for the successful administration of the country to train Indians in the different departments of government; civil, financial and judicial, so that they could participate in the administration. Second, Western education was to aid the English to secure the enlightened cooperation of the Indian people in the suppression of moral and social evils attributed to superstitious ignorance. So the most important aim was to train Indians to man the lower offices. This had the unfortunate effect of neglecting science, technology and practical education. Indian colleges still turn out young graduates qualified only to be clerks, whereas India's crying need is for doctors and engineers.

The British system failed to develop a sense of citizenship and social efficiency. Education developed only the intelligence without in any way appealing to the emotions. This, in turn, over-stimulated the self-regarding instincts and destroyed the sense of duty, or Dharma, to society and nation and hence "the decay of public spirit, of social service, of responsibility and of sacrifice for the commonweal which characterize the good citizen as distinguished from the good man." (Annie Beasant's "Kamala Lectures.") Education failed to establish a feeling of responsibility for the country as a whole and all men have been content to safe-guard the rights and privileges of family and caste.

Under such circumstances, growth of primary education has been retarded. The Hartog Committee (1929), pointed out:

Throughout the whole educational system there is waste and ineffectiveness. In the primary system, which from our point of view should be designed to produce literacy and the capacity to exercise an intelligent vote, the waste is appalling. So far as we can judge, the vast increase in numbers in primary schools produces no commensurate increase in literacy, for only a small proportion of those who are at the primary stage reach class IV, in which the attainment of literacy may be expected. . . .

Education was expected to filter down to the masses but because the country was financially poor the expectation was not realized. Further, compulsory education was made statewide but the measures to enforce it were inadequate and ineffective. Less than one of four children stayed in school long enough to become permanently literate. In some states there was no compulsion, though time and again the question was brought up at Congress Party meetings. In 1937 when the Indian National Congress met at Wardha a decision to formulate a new scheme of education which would be more meaningful to the Indian masses and regain cultural continuity with Indian traditions resulted in the Wardha scheme of Basic Education.

Mahatma Gandhi always said that all social, political, economic and educational programs are organically interconnected. To him social progress and educational reconstruction were inter-related and act and react on each other. Educational reorganization is necessary to bring greater freedom to the people of India in the social, economic and political fields; this freedom, in turn, will bring further improvement in education.

The Congress ministry which came into power in 1937 provided the opportunity for introduction of reforms in education for which Mahatma Gandhi had waited so long. He summed up his entire plan in two propositions:

1. "Primary education extending over a period of seven years or

longer and covering all the subjects up to the matriculation standard except English, plus a vocation as the vehicle to draw out the minds of boys and girls in all departments of knowledge, should take the place of what passes today under the name of primary, middle and high school education.

2. "Such education taken as a whole can and must be self supporting; in fact self support is the acid test of its reality." (Educational Reconstruction. A collection of Gandhiji's Articles on the Wardha Plan and the Reports.)

The main features were: First, free and compulsory education was to be provided for seven years on a nation-wide scale; Second, the mother tongue was to be the medium of instruction; Third, the process of education throughout this period should center around some form of manual and productive work and all the other abilities which were to be developed or in which training was to be given, as far as possible, should be integrally related to the central handicraft chosen with due regard to the environment of the child; Fourth, it was expected that this system of education would be able gradually to cover the remuneration of the teachers.

Mahatma Gandhi often pointed out that education was neither mere literacy nor learning a craft but was an all around development of the best in child and man and was to aim at the highest mental, physical and spiritual attainment.

A special committee was appointed under Dr. Zakir Hussain to give shape to the idea. His report says: "Any scheme of education designed for Indian children will in some respects radically differ from that adopted in the west. For, unlike the west, in India the nation has adopted non-violence as the method of peace for achieving all round freedom. Our children will therefore need to be taught the superiority of non-violence over violence."

New forces are at work in India and these are inter-related to the economic and cultural forces in the world and which cannot be ignored in any kind of planning. Still, India has its own special problems and a distinct set of values and these must be the core of educational reconstruction. In his Educational Reconstruction, Gandhi said:

If we want to eliminate communal strife and international strife, we must start with foundations pure and strong by rearing our younger generation on the education I have adumbrated. The plan springs out of non-violence . . . we have to make our boys true representatives of culture, our civilization, of the true genius of our nation. Europe is no example for us. It plans its programmes in terms of violence because it believes in violence. I would be the last to minimize the achievement of Russia, but the whole structure is based on force

and violence. If India has resolved to eschew violence this system of education becomes an integral part of the discipline.

What is the kind of society visualized by Gandhi in the Basic Education Scheme? A society whose life breath will be truth and non-violence. Such a society will necessarily be a democratic society, not a police state, where all people will have common interests, hence common values and whose achievement will require common experiences and undertakings. In a truly democratic society it is essential that mutual understanding, trust and cooperative, helpful living be fostered. The Basic Education Scheme seeks to fulfill this by introducing a common productive activity in school which is expected to bring about interchange of thought and community feeling.

The Zakir Hussain Committee has said that this scheme "is designed to produce workers who will view all kinds of useful work—including manual work, even scavenging as honourable and who will be both able and willing to stand on their own feet." The scheme aims at giving to the citizens of the future a keen sense of personal worth, dignity of labor, efficiency in whatever they undertake and the desire to improve and do better all the time. "In fine, the scheme envisages the idea of a cooperative community, in which the motive of social service will dominate all the activities of children during the plastic years of childhood and youth." The Wardha Scheme has interesting features.

First, after eight years it was expected that the child would have acquired sufficient skill to enable him to pursue a craft as an independent occupation. Here three points need clarification. The craft chosen should not be any craft but the basic craft which would meet the physical and social environment of the pupil. The syllabus itself should be built around these centers because the craft itself would become the focal point of the physical and social environment. So, all the subjects of study were to be integrated into one whole and were to find natural points of correlation with human activities and interests. For example, spinning in the cotton growing areas, pottery in the clay areas and carpentry in the timber regions.

Second, basic education means that the basic craft is to be the medium of education and not used as a vocational craft. As the report put it:

The object of this new educational scheme is not primarily the production of craftsmen able to practice some craft mechanically, but rather the exploitation for educative purposes of the resources implicit in craft work. This demands that productive work should not only form a part of the school curriculum—its craft side—but should also inspire the method of teaching all other subjects. Stress should be laid on principles of cooperative activity, planning, accuracy, initiative and individual responsibility in learning.

Again the craft was to be the "core" of all learning and not just an additional subject in the curriculum. Gandhi pointed this out in letters to various teachers. He insisted that spinning and carding should be the means of training the intellect. He drew out the difference between being a mere carpenter working with the hands mechanically and a skilled engineer who can use his head as well as his hands. The engineer will know mathematics and model drawing, different kinds of timber and where they come from, geography, agriculture, all closely integrated.

Suppose a child's basic craft is weaving. He would begin by learning about cotton, its discovery, how it is cultivated, where it is grown. He would learn about the climate suited for cotton growing, the soil needed, manure and chemical fertilizers used. He would learn all about other crops that can grow under similar conditions. So, the child would learn something of history, geography, agriculture and chemistry. When he learns carding he learns all about the various devices invented through the centuries to cleanse and gin cotton; spinning enables him to learn about weights, measures and time. He would learn the mechanics of the machine used. With weaving, his knowledge of machinery would increase, and he would learn about the evolution of machinery. One could add to the number of subjects that could be correlated to the craft: the different types of fuels used, their origin, their discovery, their potential and other uses to which these have been put. Further, types of clothing used in the different countries, costumes, climate and food habits can all be related. Hygiene and physiology, nutrition, vitamins can and should be correlated.

Third, perhaps the most important aspect of the scheme, the craft should be able to sustain the major portion of the running expenses of the school. The principle of self sufficiency was involved and it was felt that this measure would act as a check and insure thoroughness and efficiency in the work of both teachers and pupils. Many of Gandhiji's followers felt that the principle of self-sufficiency was not practicable and in some cases even harmful. But the "old man of Sewagram" felt that education should be purposeful and productive. In basic education, learning is centered around units of work, projects, problems and meaningful experiences. Basic education demands that purposeful activity of children should also be productive. This was explained by the Report to mean that children should make common articles of daily use and the proceeds from the sale of these articles should help to meet the cost of such education.

There was a cry of horror at the suggestion and vehement articles were written in the daily newspapers. It was felt that education would become very materialistic as pushing the child into a spoke

of the wheel of adult struggle, that child labor would be exploited and that their articles would not match the work done by expert workers and so would not sell. It was also felt that any scheme of education in which the child is expected to participate in a money making program or one which may lead to enforced labor, fatigue and exploitation, would always be looked upon with suspicion.

But why should there be any criticism of money making? Our entire civilized life revolves around money. Hence the school must provide training, not only in the right way of spending money, but also in the right way of earning it. Opportunities to earn extra money tends to give children confidence and self-respect because then they realize that they have contributed something—be it ever so little—towards the cost of their education.

The Wardha Scheme stressed the importance of the mother tongue. It was not only to be the medium of instruction, but also was to have an important place in the curriculum. This might sound unwise because English is a universal language and most business in India is conducted in English. However, forcing the use of English had only tended to create a gulf between the peoples of India and the Indian National Congress was trying desperately to bridge the gulf. Macaulay's pious hope that English education would produce "a class of persons, Indian in blood and color but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect" was an extravagance which interpreted would mean that they were anxious to keep the majority of the people ignorant. For it is an indisputable fact that the mother tongue of a child is an indispensable part of a curriculum. It is also the repository of all the wisdom of the ages, the culture of the country and the only familiar means of communication to the child. Further it was realized that India needs a lingua franca rather than English. Since one-third of the population, the largest group, speaks Hindustani that was accepted as the common language of India and was included as a compulsory subject in the curriculum. English was excluded from Basic Education.

The subject of mathematics was considered important because precision in work, ability to understand quantity and measurement, space and forms, is indispensable. The Wardha Scheme says: "The object is to develop in the pupil the capacity to solve speedily the ordinary numerical and geometrical problems arising in connection with his craft and with his home and community life. Pupils should also gain a knowledge of business method and bookkeeping."

A subject considered to be of vital importance was social studies for it was felt that subject provided one means of realizing civic values. After careful analysis a syllabus was framed to meet the needs of a changing society and the great ideals that Indians have

inherited. The Basic Scheme aims not only at mere intellectual development, but also at developing social attitudes. The Scheme recommended that emphasis should be laid on the "ideals of love, truth and justice, of cooperative endeavour, national solidarity and the equality and brotherhood of man. . . . Stories of the great liberators of mankind and their victories of peace should find a prominent place in the curriculum. Emphasis should be laid on lessons drawn from life showing the superiority of truth and non-violence and deceit." It was felt that Indian children knew very little about their own country. British history had been imposed on them with the result that social studies which should convey the "right" values in their own culture did not do so. The objectives of the social studies curriculum were explained clearly by the Committee: "The history of Indian national awakening combined with a living appreciation of India's struggle for social, political and economic freedom should prepare the pupils to bear their share of the burden joyfully and to stand the strain and stress of the period of transition."

Social studies was not to be of the dead past but of the living present and the conflicts that exist in the economic order, the evils that are inherent in social life; the privileges and the duties which will be the child's in the future. Social studies are the cradles from which the child learns to love his motherland, venerates what he has inherited and discards what has bound him in slavery, and thinks of his country's destiny in the future. Love of motherland does not mean narrow nationalism; it means understanding of others' problems, cooperation for purposes of peace, and sympathy for the struggles of the less fortunate.

General Science was to include physical sciences, natural sciences, physiology, hygiene and astronomy. It would develop in the student the power to observe accurately and the ability to test "experience by experiment." It was realized that the lives and struggles of the world's greatest scientists and their sacrifice in the cause of scientific truths holds a lesson for all children which should help train them in scientific methods.

Drawing and music were included — drawing with emphasis on design, decoration and engineering drawing, folk music with emphasis on choral singing and songs that inspire the freedom that was yet to be won.

One of the chief criticisms of the Wardha Scheme has been that religious instruction is completely ignored and that no attempt has been made to include religious teaching in even a "camouflaged" way. This is surprising, for the whole fabric of Indian society has been held together by religious ties. It is even more surprising that Mahatma Gandhi, such a deeply religious man, would omit it from his

scheme of education. God was a great reality to him and when in doubt or anguish he turned to his inner voice from Him. But, Gandhi was a realist. He was an astute statesman and his personal religious beliefs did not bind him to the practical difficulties of the situation.

India has a multiplicity of religions and it would be a Herculean task to make provision for teaching all of its religions in state schools. Every school contains Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Jews and Hindus. Which religion would you teach? The religion of the majority? Then, the fundamental rights bestowed by the Indian constitution, which says that all communities will have freedom to worship as they please, would be violated. The state owes a duty to all citizens irrespective of their caste or creed, therefore, the educational system must accommodate scholars of different religions and must necessarily be secular. Gandhiji said in his writings: "Unless there is a state religion, it is very difficult if not impossible to provide religious instruction as it would mean providing for every denomination. Such instruction is best given at home. The state would allow time for every child to receive such instruction at home or elsewhere. It is also conceivable that the state should provide facilities for private tuition by those denominations which may wish to instruct their children at school, provided that such instruction is paid for by such denominations."

This attitude was felt to be the right one and the Prime Minister of India declared that "the future Government of India must be secular in the sense that the Government will not associate itself with any religious faith, but will give freedom to all religions to function."

The Zakir Hussain Committee recommendations were accepted by the Government of India Education Department and in 1944 it was incorporated into the Postwar Educational Development Plan commonly known as the Sargent Scheme.

The most important chapter in the Sargent Report involved Basic Education, which was divided into two stages: Basic Primary or Junior, Basic Middle or Senior—the former to last five years, the latter, three years. This division was considered necessary because "at about the age of 11 or 12, with the onset of adolescence, certain mental and physical changes in boys and girls necessitate a corresponding adjustment both in the content of the curriculum and the methods of instruction." Though the two stages were to be dealt with separately, continuity was to be maintained between them. The Report did not accept the view that education, particularly at the primary stage, should be able to support itself through the sale of articles produced by the pupils, one of the main implications of the original Gandhian scheme.

The Report recommended that if pupils of ability were to be

transferred to high schools, the transfer was to take place after the age of 11 years or at the end of the Junior stage. The various forms of higher education were to extend over a minimum period of five years with a further course of advanced work for those intending to go to the University. The Basic Middle school course was to be one of advanced work in itself. After its completion the pupil was to take his place in the community as a worker and citizen.

While the Zakir Hussain Report definitely vetoed the introduction of English in the basic stage of education, the Sargent Report gave as its considered opinion that in the Basic Primary stage English should not be taught, but that in the middle stage, if there was a demand, the Director of Public Instruction could grant permission for its introduction.

At the Basic Primary stage, co-education was to be the rule, but if parents wished to withdraw their girls at the age of 12, suitable arrangements and syllabus were to be available to finish their education to the age of 14 years. The Report strongly recommended that at the primary stage all teachers were to be women, while in the middle, one-half should be women. The qualifications for teachers of all three stages was to be matriculation or its equivalent, followed by two to three years of professional training.

The framers of the Postwar Educational Development Plan took into consideration the desirability of teaching children through a craft or creative work, recognizing the educational principle of learning by doing. Thus, the stage was set for an experiment which would eventually show educators in every country whether a system of education centered around a craft would be feasible.

The First Five Year Plan recommended that certain items of importance should be given top priority. One was Basic Education. Educational facilities should be provided for at least 60 percent of the children in the age group 6 to 11 years. This was to be extended to the group 6 to 14 years old as early as possible. The percentage of girls 6 to 11 years old should be raised from 23.3 in 1950-51 to 40 in 1955-56.

The Committee on Ways and Means of Financing Educational Development in India has recognized the fact that the constitution of India requires that within 10 years of its commencement, free and compulsory education should be provided for all children until fourteen years old. But, schools were to be provided as finances permitted, and as trained personnel was available to take charge of such education. It was recommended that at least one group of model basic institutions was to be opened in each of the Part A and Part B states and in Delhi among the Part C states. Each group was to consist of a number of pre-basic and basic schools, a post-basic school, a

teachers' training school and a teachers' training college. A few experimental basic schools also were to be opened in the urban areas to adapt the system to urban needs.

It was also felt that the closest cooperation would be required between the Federal Government, the state governments and non-official bodies if the Basic Education Plan was to succeed. In addition to the services of experts in basic education, those of allied departments like agriculture, animal husbandry, and co-operatives were needed to make the plan meaningful. The training program was split into two parts; one concentrating on quality, which is slow of growth, the other on those of basic skills and knowledge which can be imparted in regional camps.

Because a great deal of wastage and stagnation occurred in the existing primary schools, new ones were not to be opened; rather, resources were to be utilized to improve and remodel the old ones along basic lines. As an immediate step the craft teachers were to be trained extensively and crafts introduced into as many schools as possible.

A major criticism of the First Five Year Plan was that the allotment was very meager. Roughly, the amounts were 5 pies (about 5 cents) per person for primary education, 4 pies for secondary and one pie for adult education. Instead of 60 per cent, only 42 per cent of children 6 to 11 years old went to school. The Second Five Year Plan was expected to remedy this defect and introduce compulsory education for all.

The Second Five Year Plan iterated that:

1. Sixty percent of children 6 to 11 years would be receiving education by the end of the Second Five Year Plan.
2. The percentage of children 11 to 14 years old in the schools was to be increased from 15 to 25 percent.
3. During the five years 50 percent of the schools were to be converted into Basic Schools, others to be ordinary elementary schools.
4. Crafts were to be introduced in 50 percent of all non-basic schools.
5. All training schools were to be converted into basic training schools.

What of the future? How has Basic Education stood the test of twelve years? The Report of the Assessment Committee (August, 1956) made 65 recommendations on the strength of its findings. Of these, only a half dozen form the core of the report. The report says basic education has been "interpreted in various ways even by people in high authority and that too many people have too many fanciful interpretations which make a caricature of it." Therefore, it was of the utmost importance that basic education should be defined clearly

and elucidated as often as necessary. The government accepted this recommendation and has since published a pamphlet, "The Concept of Basic Education," in all Indian languages.

The Report directed attention to the fact that basic education had not made satisfactory progress and that "basic schools have continued all these years without real growth." The few groups of basic schools were like isolated patches of good grass surrounded and overwhelmed by large and growing areas of non-basic schools. Even education authorities in some states looked upon the basic schools with suspicion and prevented their spreading. Instead of a process of vertical growth, it was recommended that a "horizontal process" should be introduced so that there could be a spreading. The Committee suggested that some elements of basic education should be introduced in all elementary schools to make the change-over possible at an early date. Basic education was to take the place of elementary education as it then existed and the sooner it was done the better because a large number of people were still ignorant of its meaning. To be able to do this in as healthy a fashion as possible 5 things should be introduced in all elementary schools:

1. Activities like saphai, gardening.
2. Community self-government of children through their own elected aam Sabahs.
3. Closer touch of children with the community in the social environment through useful cooperative activities.
4. Study of physical environment.
5. A simple and inexpensive craft to develop manual skills.

The Assessment Committee also felt that a time limit should be set within which the existing system should be transformed into basic. A ten-year period was thought to be the proper limit. In the Second Five Year Plan the Government has a program for converting only one-third of existing elementary schools into basic. Further, the Government plans to open 50 percent of the new schools as basic schools. One fails to see the rationality of opening 50 percent of new schools as ordinary elementary schools when all are to be converted to basic within only ten years. It is much more difficult to convert something already established than to start new things in a new way. The process of conversion not only is more expensive but usually precipitates a series of resistances that lead to difficulty. Conversion also presents a severe challenge to those educators who believe in it for only 14 percent of elementary schools and 8 percent of middle schools are basic at present.

Perhaps the most serious limitation is the great confusion that prevails about the role of the crafts and the self-sufficiency aspect.

Only village handicrafts have been introduced, with the result that urban people think it is an inferior type of education meant only for the villages, while the villagers think that the plan is meant to keep them where they are and to deprive them of all good things enjoyed by their counterparts in the urban areas. The initial mistake was made when Basic Schools were started only in rural areas, strengthening such ideas. All, therefore, must understand, as soon as possible, that Basic Education is to be a universal system for all Indian children at the elementary level.

A criticism of the scheme was that in an age of industrialization and automation the cry for basic education was considered rather strange and an average man was confused. Basic education does not forbid the modern amenities of life, but it seeks to train a person to do some of the more beautiful things with his hands. The hand made sari in India will never want for a market as it caters to individual *tastes*. It is not stereotyped and is more durable. The delicate ivory carvings, papier maché work, hand painted pottery, hand lace are all in great demand. There can be no possible dispute between the big industries and cottage work; the machine-made goods are mass-produced and cheap, while the hand made goods are expensive, but exquisite, and appeal to a different class of buyer.

How productive basic schools have been is still conjecture. The Assessment Committee also recommended that the "Government should develop as quickly as may be practicable and wherever possible an integrated course of eight years of basic education. The junior and basic schools of five years being regarded as feeder schools to centrally located senior basic schools." This was accepted but in the transition period there was to be a course of five years followed by a course of three years, keeping in mind the integration that was expected to take place. This is a serious handicap, as during the first five years children are not likely to be able to produce any marketable articles. If they stop with the five years then they are not going to be in a position to earn a decent wage. Again, if the eight years run together, then in the last three years marketable goods can be produced and the self-sufficiency implication will be workable. In many cases after the first five years children left because there were no senior basic schools to go to.

The question of teachers in the basic schools has long been a source of deep concern to the Government of India. Teachers with faith, zeal and resourcefulness are needed and when the scheme was first started, teachers from the ordinary schools had to be tempted to enroll for the necessary training to teach in basic schools. These were evidently not the right type of teachers and their presence has done more harm than good. These teachers feel that they have done

a great favor by going into basic schools and that they deserve all sorts of privileges. Their training has not been adequate and their faith has not been equal to their task. A good basic educationalist is one who has made a detailed study of both education and basic education and has thus developed a natural affection for it. He should try to be a constant researcher on the latest ideas or suggestions on basic education. He should not be afraid to incorporate new ideas into the system. No scientist has given up an experiment because he was criticized. Where knowledge is concerned the scientist has been fearless; where the future of the young minds is concerned the educator should be prepared to shoulder a sacred responsibility to do his best. As the great Indian poet, Tagore said:

Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high,
Where knowledge is free,
Where the world has not been broken up by narrow domestic walls,
Where words come out from the depths of truth,
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way in the dreary
desert sand of dead habit,
Where the mind is led forward by Thee into ever-widening thought
and action,
Into that heaven of Freedom, my Father, let my country awake.

Book Reviews

MODERN COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE. E. E. LeMasters. 620 pages. Macmillan, New York, 1957. \$5.50.

Text books are usually reviewed by prominent persons teaching in the field, but this book is reviewed by the consumer, a student in a marriage education course. A senior in homemaking education at Ohio State University, I read this book with an eye toward answering my own questions about marriage; but I read it also with a view toward its use as a reference when I become a high school teacher next fall.

An instructor looking for a marriage course text will find this book worth considering. From the student's point of view it is easily read, and at the same time provides technically good discussion material. The author is dedicated to the proposition that "a marriage text should do more than aid the student with his personal adjustment, it should also help him orient to the societal problems related to modern courtship and marriage." This is noted particularly in the chapters on "Sexual Adjustment in Marriage" and two chapters dealing with male and female subcultures. Not only does the author point out many of the common folklore beliefs, which he confirms or discards; he also gives clear, positive examples of psychological differences between male and female in our culture. He frankly discusses the sexual problems of wife and husband which result from early conditioning and differences in sexual desire. After discussing "Personality Factors in Marital Adjustment," he focuses on the "nonpsychological" elements basic to successful marriage, such as: "Family Background Patterns," "Social Class Occupational Factors," "In-Laws," and "Marriage and Money."

LeMasters utilizes research and case studies as documentation. Often he describes three or four research studies on a subject, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses. At the end of each chapter references and a selected reading list of current material are given.

Judging from some of the bull sessions on my campus, religion is a concern for college marriage courses; interest is especially high in interfaith marriages. LeMasters writes on the three religious subcultures: Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant. He points out the religious problems that may arise in an interfaith marriage. Particularly helpful in a list of eight suggestions for exploring religious compatibility.

Material is presented in three parts: Perspective, The American Courtship System, and Marriage in our Society. In "Perspective" the author defines some of the concepts used throughout the book, for example—culture, subculture, and culture conflict—and indicates what will follow and how the material is compiled and organized.

In "The American Courtship System" Random Dating, Going Steady, and Pinning are discussed. Courtship is analyzed more thoroughly than in other

texts I have studied. However, this part would seem to be of more interest and benefit to high school students than to the college students. The last three chapters of this section on Engagement, Sex and Courtship, and Military Service are more applicable to the problems of college students.

This book will probably not "date" rapidly, for such chapters as the one on "Wives Who Work" face the "facts of life," this one concerning employed wives and mothers. He shows how it may be necessary to revise our thinking concerning this aspect of American culture.

The book answers many of the college student's questions and provides references for further study of specific questions. Some of the examples appear oversimplified. However, most of the analogies used serve to make theory more practical.

This book is an effective addition to the literature on marriage education and might well be used in university courses in this field.

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PRINCIPLES OF PERCEPTION. S. Howard Bartley. 482 pages. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1958. \$6.50.

Dr. Bartley has written a book which is comprehensive, systematic, and almost unique. This work is not simply a collection of facts or experimental findings, but an attempt to develop a rigorous outlook compatible with existing data and theory. While such attempts are not uncommon in psychology, they are almost nonexistent in the area of human perception.

The author insists that we must deal with two separate domains in the study of perception. The first is the physical world, providing energy transformations which are describable in the terminology of the physicist. The second is the experimental world in which organisms react to stimuli. Bartley would avoid confusing the two by use of separate terminology.

As defined in this book, "perception is the overall activity of the organism that immediately follows or accompanies energistic impingements upon the sense organs" (p. 22). The emphasis is upon a reaction which is closely related in time to the detection of external energy. Included in this definition would be those reflexes which can be classed as discriminatory. Any reaction which is not discriminatory is something other than perceptual. "Perception, in representing the direct contact of the organism with its surrounds, is more basic than any form of behavior that may be called derivative" (p. 447). Some properties of this basic response include symbolism, classification, evaluation, prognosis, and interpretation. Bartley's very adequate illustrations of these properties make it easy to regard perception as a much broader concept than has been usual in the past. In such a framework the problems of studying, thinking, knowing, learning, and even of personality can be viewed as the problems of perception.

A major portion of the book is devoted to a presentation of the findings and methodology in this very broad area called perception. Relating, in any organized way, the tremendous body of data subsumed under the title of perception is a theoretical task of some proportions. Dr. Bartley has had more success than is usual in accomplishing such a task.

Visual, auditory, space, kinesthetic, vestibular, gustatory, olfactory, tactual,

and even social perception are discussed systematically and understandably. Some psychologists may feel that certain omissions in their specific interest areas reduces the value of the book as a comprehensive treatment of these areas. While the book is not as complete as some would like, this is perhaps compensated for by the fact that it is completely understandable and very readable. Bartley's work should serve as a fine text for beginning students and as a valuable frame of reference for graduate students.

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COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH THE MENTALLY RETARDED. Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred F. Demartino. 478 Pages. Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1957. \$7.50.

There is considerable need to shift our perspective regarding psychopathic treatment of the mentally retarded child. Regardless of the etiology of the difficulty, there has been a tendency for social workers, psychiatrists and psychologists, to undervalue the contribution psychotherapy can make toward helping such children develop whatever potential they have. Such treatment has tended to be denied to the retarded child, it being frequently assumed to have little merit. This is particularly the case when results are slow in coming and when the demands made upon psychotherapists today are so great. In this book, however, we have in one place a resonant voice pointing out how stereotypic has been the point of view of psychotherapists.

Psychotherapy and counselling have a decided place in the care and treatment of the retarded child. Perhaps this is based on the fact that emotional responsiveness and the need for love and affection play an important part in the lives of these children, as with all others. Help for them, then, in this area can contribute to their well-being. Standard procedures, however, are not indicated; alternative ways will have to be found.

This book presents a collection of relevant writings bearing on this important problem, organized into ten chapters, each of which deals with particular aspects of the over-all situation. The major techniques discussed are: Counselling and Psychotherapy; Psychoanalytic Methods; Group Therapy; Play Therapy; Psychodrama; Special Therapy and Individual Therapy. In addition a series of readings dealing with parent counselling is included.

Finally, an interesting and comprehensive overview of the problem is presented by Dr. DeMartino which highlights many of the points made in previous articles and provides as integrated perspective.

Of course, anthologies have the inevitable difficulty of variation among the articles in quality and scope, and hence value. The authors in this case seem to have selected all relevant and contributing articles, although some are of less import than others.

Let us hope that this collection, in the hands of the perspicacious clinical student and research worker, will help stimulate more efforts directed toward psychotherapeutic help and psychological understanding of the retarded child.

IRVING E. SIGEL
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Book briefs

THE LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGE: A CHAPTER IN AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY. George P. Schmidt. 310 pages. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1957. \$6.00.

Here is a most interesting account of the liberal arts college, "the original institution of higher learning in America." The author, a professor of history at Douglass College, Rutgers University, frankly admits it is not a definitive history but he has presented a selective and readable story of the development of the liberal arts college over three centuries from its beginnings in the independent college to its present status as part of the large complex university. The chapters dealing with the "old-time college" portray the early beginnings and religious roots, the "classical" curriculum which remained virtually unchanged till the latter part of the nineteenth century, the rise of women's colleges, the quality of personal leadership exercised by the college president, and a lively account of campus life. The later chapters on recent trends are less vividly told probably because they reflect the complicated confused contemporary picture. Current differences in the philosophy and the content of the liberal arts are touched upon, especially the Dewey and Hutchins viewpoints. The debate continues and though the definition and role of the liberal arts today is by no means clear, the author asserts his confidence in the vigor of the liberal arts and maintains its central importance as a "priceless component" of the future pattern of higher education.

MEDICINE AND MAN. Ritchie Calder. 256 pages. Mentor, New American Library, New York, 1958. Paper, 50¢.

This "pocketbook" is a concentrated history of Man's efforts to cure his ills. Without sacrificing accuracy the material, much of it seldom found in the more ponderous histories of medicine, is presented in a fast-moving style fascinating to read. Throughout, the text is lightened by omission of dry details of little interest to the general reader and inclusion of highly personalized, sometimes whimsical, anecdotes. The 12 parts develop the story from witchcraft, through the Middle Ages and "The Great Advances" to "Unfinished Business" and "Healthy Man in a Healthy World." The material is presented in 136 short sections such as: "The Auld Witch, Saddlebag Drugs, Pagan Psychiatry, The Hungry Dog [Pavlov], Big Chief Laughing Gas, Cell Citizens, and Freudian Slip. The unusual treatment of the material makes the reading interesting without detracting from its informational value.

PREGNANCY AND BIRTH: A BOOK FOR EXPECTANT PARENTS. Alan F. Guttmacher. 255 pages. New American Library, New York, 1958. Paper, 50¢.

Availability of this reprint is given notice here because of its content, of which the *Journal of the American Medical Association* said: "Pregnancy and Birth goes into much greater detail than any previous volume written for the expectant parent. . . . It is written in Dr. Guttmacher's characteristically clear and interesting style, so that one can easily read this book from cover to cover. . . . Highly recommended to expectant parents."

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